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The Effect of Product Market Competition on Job Instability
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This paper assesses the impact of product market competition on job instability as proxied by 
the use of fixed-term labor contracts. Using both worker data from the Spanish Labor Force 
Survey and firm data from the Spanish Business Strategies Survey, I show that job instability 
rises with competition. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in competition in an 
economic sector decreases the probability that a fixed-term worker gets an open-ended 
contract within that sector in a given year by more than 30%. The effect is identified by 
means of exogenous shifts in competition brought about by changes in legislation. 
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Workers hired under a ￿xed-term in place of an open-ended labor contract present worse
unemployment prospects as well as stronger perception of job instability, which ultimately
determines household decisions. The existing studies on the use of ￿xed-term contracts
focus on the role of individual characteristics, labor histories and institutions in deter-
mining the type of labor contract that ￿rms o⁄er to workers, but they omit the impact
of product market competition faced by ￿rms. However, competition has been shown to
have a signi￿cant in￿ uence on ￿rms￿decisions about the labor market. In particular, pre-
vious literature has found that product market competition a⁄ects not only employment
and wage levels1, but also wage inequality, returns to skill, executives￿incentives, workers￿
training and discrimination, among others. In this paper, product market competition
is shown to increase job instability as measured by the intensity of use of ￿xed-term
contracts. Accounting for the e⁄ect of product market competition allows to explain a
substantial part of the variation in the use of ￿xed-term versus open-ended labor con-
tracts. Therefore, the big changes in the level of competition in recent years as a result of
globalization, market integration and privatization are useful to explain the proliferation
of ￿xed-term contracts.
In most European countries, labor contracts are either ￿xed-term (temporary) or open-
ended (permanent). Fixed-term contracts are characterized by having a pre-determined
duration, negligible ￿ring costs and a maximum for the amount of time a worker can be
sequentially hired under that type of contract. After that period expires, the ￿rm has to
discard the worker or o⁄er her an open-ended position. In contrast, open-ended contracts
have unlimited duration and higher ￿ring costs. Then, the use of ￿xed-term contracts
is a key indicator of job instability because they are not only associated with the actual
probability of becoming unemployed, but also with a worker￿ s perception of instability
1See for instance Nicoletti & Scarpetta (2005), Gri¢ th, Harrison and Macartney (2007) and Fiori
et al. (2007) for empirical country-level analysis on the incidence of product market competition on
employment and wages. For theoretical studies on the interactions between product market competition,
employment and wages, see Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Ebell and Haefke (2009).
2while employed which connects it directly to workers￿welfare. Throughout this paper, I
focus on type of labor contract as an observable measure of job instability and complement
the analysis with the study of sector switches and transitions to unemployment.
The use of ￿xed-term contracts in Spain is the highest in Europe. Employment rela-
tionships in that country traditionally start with a ￿xed-term contract and then, employ-
ers take the decision on whether to convert the ￿xed-term contract into an open-ended
contract or not. Hence, the vast majority of workers are a⁄ected by ￿xed-term contracts
at some point in their working lifes. Moreover, having a ￿xed-term contract is the main
determinant of losing a job in Spain during the current economic crisis. In fact, this
type of labor contract is found to be much more relevant as a predictor of job loss than
educational attainment, age, gender or nationality2. Additionally, De la Rica and Iza
(2005) show that holding a ￿xed-term contract leads to a delay in marriage and par-
enthood. Thus, the quantitative and qualitative importance of type of labor contract in
Spain justi￿es its use as a benchmark case.
After the creation of ￿xed-term contracts in 1984, there was a rapid increase in the
proportion of ￿xed-term over total salaried workers in Spain. This proportion stabilized
around 1992. Since then, the incidence of ￿xed-term contracts has remained relatively
stable at around one third of salaried workers3 (see Figure 1), despite the fact that the
Spanish government has promoted several laws to reduce their use. Only under the recent
economic crisis, the incidence of ￿xed-term contracts has decreased as a consequence of the
overall reduction in employment, which has a⁄ected mainly ￿xed-term workers. Hence,
the understanding of the determinants of the use of ￿xed-term contracts is of essential
policy interest.
The apparent stability of the overall proportion of ￿xed-term contracts does not hold,
however, when disaggregating the proportion of ￿xed-term contracts across sectors. Figure
2These conclusions are re￿ ected in the quarterly bulletins of the Spanish Labor Observatory of the
Crisis (Observatorio Laboral de la Crisis): http://www.fedea.es/observatorio/
3The average proportion of ￿xed-term workers over total number of contracted workers in the European
Union is 15%, according to data from Eurostat.
32 displays the evolution of the proportion of ￿xed-term contracts over time for ￿ve di⁄erent
sectors, corresponding to the key percentiles of the distribution of the proportion of ￿xed-
term contracts by sector. The sectors with the lowest and highest proportion of ￿xed-
term over total workers are mining (10%) and agriculture (60%). Moreover, not only is
there considerable variation in the average across sectors, there is also great variation in
their time trends. For instance, between 1996 and 1997, while the recycling and medical
equipment sectors experience a rise, the electronic material sector su⁄ers a decrease in
the proportion of ￿xed-term workers. This indicates that there is likely to be some factor
varying across sectors and over time that a⁄ects the use of ￿xed-term contracts.
In this paper, I show that product market competition is an important factor behind
the observed variation across sectors because product market competition has a causal
impact on job instability as measured by the incidence of ￿xed-term contracts. Empirical
results show that a one standard deviation increase in the level of competition reduces the
probability that a ￿xed-term worker becomes open-ended within a sector in a given year
by more than 30%, and it increases the probability of becoming unemployed by more than
35%. Additionally, I ￿nd that the elimination of barriers to entry such that one market
transitions from legal monopoly to free entry induces a decrease of 12% in the probability
of becoming open-ended within a sector in a given year for workers hired under ￿xed-term
contracts. These results are robust to the use of di⁄erent individual databases as well as
￿rm level data. They are also consistent across di⁄erent measures of competition.
This paper is related to the literature on the impact of product market competi-
tion on labor market outcomes. It has been shown that product market competition
induces certain improvements in the functioning of the labor market, mainly in outcomes
related with e¢ ciency. In particular, product market competition4 boosts productivity
4The concepts and measures of product market competition di⁄er greatly across studies. Gri¢ th
(2001) uses the implementation of the European Union Single Market Program as a quasi-experiment.
Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) make use of changes in entry regulation as a source of increases in com-
petition. Cuæat and Guadalupe (2006) study the e⁄ect of foreign competition as measured by import
penetration. Levine, Levkov and Rubinstein (2008) take advantage of bank deregulation to identify an
exogenous intensi￿cation of competition. Heyman, Svaleryd and Vlachos (2008) use ￿rms￿takeovers
as a determinant of increases in competition. Bertrand (2004) makes use of changes in exchange-rate
4(Gri¢ th, 2001), increases employment (Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002), rises executive in-
centives (Cuæat and Guadalupe, 2006), induces more on workplace training (Bassanini
and Brunello, 2010), reduces gender discrimination (Heyman et al., 2008) and lowers race
discrimination (Levine et al., 2008). In contrast, product market competition is thought
to have negative e⁄ects on labor market outcomes related to workers￿welfare and in-
equality. Speci￿cally, competition has been found to decrease wage insurance against the
business cycle provided to workers by ￿rms (Bertrand, 2004) and increase wage inequal-
ity (Guadalupe, 2007). The closest paper to this one is Goldberg, Tracy and Aaronson
(1999). They study whether exchange-rate movements as inductors of changes in the
competitiveness of US ￿rms have an impact on job turnover as measured by the proba-
bility of job switching and the probability of industry switching. Their ￿ndings suggest
no signi￿cant e⁄ect of dollar movements on job turnover. This paper is, to the best of my
knowledge, the ￿rst to empirically address the e⁄ect of product market competition on
job instability as measured by the type of labor contract as well as the ￿rst to study the
interactions of type of labor contracts and product market competition in the context of
a theoretical model.
In order to illustrate the importance of the question addressed here, I ￿rst propose a
theoretical model that sheds light on the channels through which product market compe-
tition may a⁄ect transitions from ￿xed-term to open-ended employment. When deciding
on which workers to make open-ended and which ones to keep as ￿xed-term, ￿rms face
a trade o⁄ between higher productivity and higher ￿ring costs (open-ended contracts al-
low the ￿rm to keep the most productive workers but makes separation more costly)5.
The degree to which ￿rms are willing to pay more aggregate severance pay in exchange
for higher productivity depends on the prevailing level of competition. This explains why
movements to generate exogenous variation in import competition. Guadalupe (2007) applies two quasi-
experiments based on an exogenous and sudden appreciation of the Pound and the implementation of
the European Union Single Market Program, respectively.
5This trade o⁄ has been studied by Blanchard and Landier (2002). They claim that the di⁄erence
in ￿ring costs between open-ended and ￿xed-term contracts is the reason why ￿rms may be willing to
sacri￿ce gains in productivity learned through screening.
5competition may have an impact on the type of contracts used by a ￿rm. This model is, to
the best of my knowledge, the ￿rst one to combine product market competition and type
of labor contract. It takes into account the di⁄erent dimensions of product market compe-
tition, namely, market size, product di⁄erentiation and entry cost, and includes important
aspects of ￿xed-term contracts like: (i) their usefulness as screening device, (ii) the fact
that ￿xed-term workers face a higher probability of separation from the ￿rm, and (iii) the
di⁄erence in dismissal costs between ￿xed-term and open-ended contracts. The model
predicts that in equilibrium, when the number of transitions to open-ended contracts is
lower (higher) than the value arising under perfect competition, more competition induces
more (less) transitions. This can be interpreted as product market competition moving
the transition rate towards some intermediate e¢ cient value. Thus, empirical analysis is
needed to clarify which is the direction of the impact of product market competition on
the use of ￿xed-term and open-ended contracts.
The empirical estimation focuses on three related outcomes. Firstly, transitions from
￿xed-term to open-ended contracts, which are particularly relevant because the vast ma-
jority of open-ended contracts are acquired only after a period under a ￿xed-term contract
in the same ￿rm. G￿ell and Petrongolo (2007) highlight that more than 90% of new labor
contracts registered in the Spanish National Employment O¢ ce are ￿xed-term contracts
and Bover and Gomez (2004) report that exit rates from unemployment into ￿xed-term
employment are ten times larger than exit rates into open-ended employment. Secondly,
the estimation of transitions from ￿xed-term to open-ended contracts is complemented by
an speci￿cation where the dependent variable is the proportion of ￿xed-term workers in
the ￿rm. Thirdly, sector switches are also studied. Fourthly, transitions to unemployment
constitute a complementary object of interest.
The causal impact of product market competition on job instability is identi￿ed by
means of exogenous changes in legislation. In particular, I apply an instrumental variable
strategy based on changes in anti-competitive legislation in key input sectors. Addition-
ally, I propose a quasi-natural experiment based on the implementation of the European
6Union Directives enhancing competition in Spain.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
model that relates product market competition and transitions from ￿xed-term to open-
ended employment and which provides a framework for the empirical analysis. Section
3 presents the empirical methodology used, i.e., the instrumental variable approach and
the quasi-experiment. Section 4 describes the databases in use, the construction of the




I propose a model that illustrates how the type of labor contract may be a⁄ected by prod-
uct market competition. I focus on the use of ￿xed-term contracts as workers￿screening
devices. The possibility of using ￿xed-term contracts as a mechanism to screen the worker
induces interactions of competition and type of contracts di⁄erent from the ones between
competition and employment.
This partial-equilibrium model interacts the product and labor markets through the
cost function of the ￿rm in the spirit of Raith (2003). There are two periods. In the ￿rst
period, workers are hired under ￿xed-term contracts, production takes place, the ￿rm
learns the productivity of its matches with workers, ￿rms compete in prices and pro￿t
realizes. In the second period, the ￿rm decides which workers to make open-ended and
which ones to keep as ￿xed-term, exogenous separations occur, production takes place,
￿rms compete in prices and second period pro￿t realizes.
2.1.1 Product market
The product market is modelled ￿ la Salop. Firms are positioned symmetrically around a
circle of circumference one. The circle is populated by consumers with a mass of m. Each
7consumer buys one unit of the good. Consumers prefer the variety closer to them and
they incur in a transportation cost which is a proportion d of the distance between them
and the ￿rm they buy from. This transportation cost represents product di⁄erentiation.
Firms enter the market freely up to the payment of a ￿xed cost, F. Labor is the only
production input. The unit cost is de￿ned as ct = c ￿ at for each ￿rm, where t re￿ ects
the period. This implies that in both periods there is a ￿xed unit cost c that is reduced
according to at, the average productivity of workers employed in the ￿rm in that period.
The model is solved by backward induction. Firstly, the pro￿t function is optimized
to get the optimal prices as in the ordinary Salop model. Secondly, the pro￿t function
conditional on choosing the optimal price is maximized with respect to the proportion of
open-ended contracts in the second period, to obtain the optimal contracting rule. The
focus is on the decision on type of labor contract that occurs in the second period. After
computing the optimal prices and plugging them into the pro￿t function, it results in:
￿ = ￿1 + ￿￿2 ￿ F










(E(c) ￿ c + a1)
￿2
where m stands for market size as de￿ned above, d denotes product di⁄erentiation, n is
the number of ￿rms, E(c) represents the expected value of other ￿rms￿costs, c is a ￿xed
unit cost, and a1 denote the average labor productivity in period 1.










(E(c) ￿ c + a2)
￿2
￿ P
where a2 denote the average productivity in period 2 and, P represents severance pay
which is de￿ned in the next subsection.
Note that pro￿t increases with the di⁄erence between the expected value of other
￿rms￿costs and ￿rm￿ s unit costs. The extent to which pro￿t reacts to that di⁄erence
8depends on the parameters of competition.
The level of competition in this framework is de￿ned according to the value of market
size, m, product di⁄erentiation, d, and entry cost, F. In particular, an increase in the level
of competition occurs if market size, m, increases, product di⁄erentiation, d, decreases
or the ￿xed cost, F, is reduced. The number of ￿rms, n, is endogenous to the level of
competition.
2.1.2 Labor market
There are two types of worker-￿rm matches, high and low productivity matches. Each of
them induces a unit cost of c￿￿1 or c￿￿2; respectively, where ￿1 > ￿2: Actual unit cost is
a linear combination of the unit cost induced by each type of worker with weights equal to
the proportion of each type of worker in the ￿rm. Each worker￿ s productivity in the ￿rm
is unknown a priori. Workers are drawn from a discrete distribution of types such that
the employer-employee match has productivity ￿1 with probability p and productivity ￿2
with probability 1 ￿ p:
There are two types of labor contracts, namely, ￿xed-term and open-ended contracts.
In the ￿rst period all workers have ￿xed-term contracts and in the second period, both
types of contracts coexist. Workers leave the ￿rm according to the exogenous separation
rate l for ￿xed-term workers and s for open-ended workers, where l > s. This assumption
captures that open-ended contracted workers are less likely to leave the ￿rm, and hence
￿rms can use open-ended contracts to keep the most productive workers.
When a open-ended worker leaves the ￿rm, the ￿rm has to provide her a severance
pay. Let S stand for total severance pay if all workers were hired open-endedly and then
replaced. Actual severance pay, P, is a proportion of S that depends on the proportion
of high productivity matches, p, the proportion of high productivity matches which are
o⁄ered a open-ended contract, ￿, and the separation rate for high productivity workers,
s. In the event of a separation, a new worker is drawn from the same distribution of types
as in the ￿rst period.
92.2 Finding the optimal contract rule
Which workers will be kept under a ￿xed-term contract and which ones will be o⁄ered
an open-ended contract in the second period?. There are two potential optimal strategies
for the ￿rm:
1. Selection on high productivity matches: All low productivity workers are kept under
￿xed-term contracts and the ￿rm decides on the proportion of high productivity
workers to o⁄er open-ended contracts.
2. Selection on low productivity matches: All high productivity workers are o⁄ered
open-ended contracts and the ￿rm decides on the proportion of low productivity
workers to keep under open-ended contracts.
Any case between those two would be suboptimal for the ￿rm. Hiring a high produc-
tivity worker using a ￿xed-term contract while hiring a low productivity worker under
a open-ended contract implies that expected productivity decreases while expected sev-
erance pay stays constant, with respect to the case where the high productivity worker
is hired using a open-ended contract and the low productivity worker is hired using a
￿xed-term contract6.
Selection on high productivity matches is more pro￿table than selection on low pro-
ductivity matches7. In this case, more open-ended contracts imply higher productivity
but also higher expected severance pay. This is consistent with the literature on the ex-
istence of a causal link between productivity and ￿xed-term contracts. For the case of
Spain, Dolado and Stucchi (2008) ￿nd that high conversion rates from ￿xed-term to open-
ended contracts increase a ￿rm￿ s productivity, while high shares of ￿xed-term contracts
decrease it. Similar conclusions are reached by Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) for Italy and
Engellandt and Riphahn (2005) for the Swiss case. Thus, we focus on case 1.
6Cipollone and Guel￿ (2003) show that permanent workers are selected to be the most productive
ones. This assumption has been also used in Caggese and Cuæat (2008).
7Derivations that lead to conclude that selection on high productivity matches is more pro￿table than
selection on low productivity matches are available from the author upon request.
102.2.1 Solving the model
The proportion of high productivity matches employed under open-ended contracts in
period 2, ￿, is our object of interest. Firm productivity and severance pay depend on ￿
according to the following expressions:
E(a2) = p￿1 + (1 ￿ p)￿2 + p(1 ￿ p)(l ￿ s)(￿1 ￿ ￿2)￿
P = p￿sS
Note that both expressions are increasing in ￿. More high productivity workers with
open-ended contracts induces higher productivity because less high productivity matches
will be replaced but it also induces higher total severance pay because more workers will
be entitled to severance pay.
Substituting these expressions in the pro￿t function, deriving with respect to ￿ and















p(1 ￿ p)(l ￿ s)(￿1 ￿ ￿2)
Under perfect competition, d goes to zero and n goes to in￿nity. Hence, the e¢ cient







p(1 ￿ p)(l ￿ s)
Let A denote the ratio between the expected severance pay for a high productivity
worker and the relative expected gain in productivity derived from hiring a high produc-
tivity worker under a open-ended instead of a ￿xed-term contract. Analytically, this can
be written as: A = sS
m
n (1￿p)(l￿s)(￿1￿￿2): Note that, under perfect competition, the equi-
librium proportion of open-ended high productivity workers, ￿, does not depend on the
competition parameters in A: However, when the market is not perfectly competitive, A
11bigger than one is associated with values of the proportion of open-ended high produc-
tivity workers, ￿, that are lower than the e¢ cient value, ￿e, and A smaller than one is
associated with values of the proportion of open-ended high productivity workers, ￿, that
are higher than the e¢ cient value, ￿e.
How do changes in product market competition a⁄ect the proportion of open-ended
high productivity workers, ￿, when the market is not perfectly competitive?. Comparative
statics with endogenous number of ￿rms show that the impact of competition on the
proportion of high productivity workers hired under a open-ended contract depends on








2 - - -
1
2 6 A < 2 + + -
A > 2 + + +
where Cd, Cm and CF represent the di⁄erent aspects of competition as de￿ned by d, m
and F, respectively8.
To sum up, comparative statics show that product market competition decreases the
proportion of high productivity workers with open-ended contracts, ￿, if one of the fol-
lowing two conditions is satis￿ed: (i) A < 1
2, i.e., severance pay is very low compared
to the gain from retaining high quality workers or (ii) 1
2 6 A < 2, i.e., severance pay is
relatively low, and the increase in competition is driven by a reduction in entry costs. In
all other cases, i.e., either if severance pay is very high, or if it is relatively high and the
increase in competition is driven by a decrease in product di⁄erentiation or an increase
in market size, more competition decreases job instability.
Therefore, low values of A imply high values of the proportion of open-ended high
productivity workers, ￿, and are associated to more competition inducing a reduction in




dCF represent the change in the proportion of open-ended over total high
productivity workers as a consequence of a marginal change in competition induced by d, m and F,
respectively.
12the proportion of open-ended high productivity workers, ￿. In contrast, high values of A
imply low values of the proportion of open-ended high productivity workers, ￿, and are
associated to more competition inducing an increase in the proportion of open-ended high
productivity workers, ￿. Intermediate values of A are associated to a more ambiguous
prediction. However, note that changes in competition also in￿ uence the value of A. In
particular, A decreases with competition if it is induced by d or m, and increases with
competition if it is induced by F. This implies that A low and high are the only stable
values.
2.3 Implications
The theoretical framework makes explicit the trade o⁄between productivity and severance
pay that ￿rms face when deciding whether to hire workers using ￿xed-term or open-
ended contracts under heterogeneity in the quality of the employer-employee matches. In
particular, all low productivity workers are kept under ￿xed-term contracts, while the
￿rm decides on which high productivity workers to convert into open-ended. Hence, more
open-ended contracts induce more productivity and higher severance pay.
This model not only illustrates the channels through which product market compe-
tition may impact the use of labor contracts, it also provides some insights that help to
interpret empirical facts. If in estimation, competition is found to reduce the propor-
tion of workers that transition from ￿xed-term to open-ended contracts, this would be
consistent with the case where A is relatively small: In this case, the expected cost of
having an open-ended vs. a ￿xed-term worker is low with respect to the relative expected
loss in productivity of hiring a high productivity worker under a ￿xed-term instead of a
open-ended contract. Under this condition, ￿ is high relative to the value under perfect
competition. On the contrary, the ￿nding that competition induces more open-ended
contracts is coherent with the case when A is relatively big, in which the actual ￿ is lower
than value under perfect competition.
In general, the analysis of how the proportion of ￿xed-term workers that transition
13to open-ended contracts changes according to the parameters of competition shows that
competition is moving the transition rate ￿ towards some intermediate e¢ cient value9.
This is consistent with the general consensus on the existence of some steady-state com-
position of employment in terms of ￿xed-term and open-ended employees as argued in
Dolado, Garc￿a-Serrano and Jimeno (2002). Empirical analysis is needed to disentangle
which is the situation that applies in practice.
3 Empirical strategy
The aim of the empirical analysis is to address the direction and magnitude of the causal
relationship between product market competition and job instability. In the main speci-
￿cation, transitions of individuals from ￿xed-term to open-ended contracts are estimated
as a function of variables measuring competition and a set of individual-level controls
using data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey. This speci￿cation is complemented by
another in which the proportion of open-ended contracts in a ￿rm is estimated as a func-
tion of variables measuring competition and a set of ￿rm-level controls using the Business
Strategies Survey.
3.1 Individual level analysis of transitions from ￿xed-term to
open-ended contracts
For the analysis performed at the individual level, the e⁄ect of competition on transitions
from ￿xed-term to open-ended contracts is estimated by means of a linear duration model
where the equation of interest can be written as follows:
P(yijt = 1) = ￿0 + ￿1Cjt + ￿2Xijt + ￿3Wjt + ￿4Vj + ￿5Zt + "ijt (1)
9In particular, as competition goes to in￿nity, i.e., market size goes to in￿nity, unit transportation
costs go to zero and entry costs go to zero, and then, the proportion of permanent high productivity




14where yijt is equal to one if individual i transitions from ￿xed-term to open-ended contract
within sector j at year t, P() represents the probability of the event in brackets happening,
and Cjt is a measure of competition (see section 3.3 for details). With respect to controls,
Xijt includes individual characteristics, namely, age, a married indicator, a household head
binary variable, a high-school graduate dummy, a university graduate binary variable, and
an Spanish citizenship indicator, number of coworkers, and ￿xed-term contract duration
dummies (in years), Wjt stands for the sector-time average di⁄erence in wages between
open-ended and ￿xed-term workers, Vj represents a set of sector dummies, Zt includes
year and quarter dummies. Finally, "ijt is the residual.
The dependent variable varies at the individual, sector and time levels, while the
measure of competition varies only by sector and time. This could lead to misleading
standard errors due to the fact that the identifying variation is lower than the variation
existing at the individual level. To avoid this, standard errors are clustered at the sector-
time level. Alternatively, two dimensional clustering is applied to address Bertrand, Du￿ o
and Mullainathan (2004)￿ s concern that standard errors could be underestimated due to
serial correlation in the outcome of study.
A shock in the level of product market competition may induce some indirect e⁄ects
in addition to the direct impact of competition on job instability. In particular, competi-
tion may have indirect e⁄ects by a⁄ecting the composition of the pool of workers in the
industry, the degree to which workers switch between sectors and the sector composition
of the economy.
Product market competition may induce changes in the composition of the sector￿ s
labor force in terms of observable as well as unobservable characteristics, and ￿rms may
then decide on the type of labor contract accordingly. In particular, individuals with
"good" unobserved characteristics tend to transition to open-ended employment ￿rst.
Hence, the pool of workers that at each point in time are observed holding a ￿xed-term
contract are the "worse" ones in terms of unobserved characteristics. This implies that
stronger shocks to competition would be needed in order to alter their labor contracts and
15thus, ignoring this fact would result in weaker estimates. In order to remove this indirect
e⁄ect, several individual controls account for changes in workers￿observed characteristics.
Moreover, individual ￿xed e⁄ects are added in some speci￿cations in order to average out
the e⁄ect of individual unobserved time invariant traits.
Additionally, changes in product market competition may induce workers to switch
across sectors, and sector switching may induce changes in type of labor contract. In
particular, sector switching is often associated with a new ￿xed-term contract. In order
to avoid this confounding e⁄ect on the results, I consider observations of workers that
switch sector as censored at the time of the switch.
Finally, competition may induce some general equilibrium e⁄ects that may ultimately
have an impact on type of labor contract. Workers may move across sectors as a result of
competition shocks and therefore, the relative importance of each sector in the economy
may change with the degree of competition. If the sectors that provide less open-ended
jobs expand (shrink), this leads to a decrease (increase) in the average transition rate. To
prevent this from a⁄ecting the results, I weigh each observation using the ratio between
the number of workers in the sector one year before the date of the interview and the
number of workers in the sector at the time of the interview, in fact keeping the size of
each sector unchanged10.
3.2 Firm level analysis of the proportion of open-ended con-
tracts
For the analysis performed at the ￿rm level, the equation of interest is the following:
Pfjt = ￿0 + ￿1Cjt + ￿2Xfjt + ￿3Vj + ￿4Zt + Uf + "fjt (2)
where Pfjt is the proportion of open-ended over total contracted workers in ￿rm f
operating in sector j at year t, and Cjt stands for a measure of competition. Regarding
10Theoretically the average of the weights should be close to one. In my sample, it is 0.998.
16controls, Xfjt includes a set of ￿rm controls, namely, number of workers, percentage of en-
gineers and college graduates (separating long and short degrees), percentage of part-time
open-ended workers, ratio between blue and white collar workers, wages over production,
workers training expenditures over production, worker compensations over production,
a dummy for merged ￿rm, an indicator for split ￿rm, a binary variable for individual
entrepreneur, R&D over production and percentage of public capital, Vj represents sector
indicators, Zt stands for year dummies, Uf includes ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects. Finally, "fjt is the
residual.
Again the measure of competition varies at a higher level of aggregation than the
dependent variable, hence estimated standard errors are clustered at the sector-time level.
Product market competition may have an impact on the characteristics of the pool
of ￿rms that operate in a sector at each point in time. Hence, together with several
￿rm characteristics, ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects are added to account for ￿rm-speci￿c time invariant
features.
Analogously to the individual level regression, each observation is weighted according
to the ratio between the number of workers in the sector one year before the date of
the interview and the number of workers in the sector in the year of the interview and
consequently, the size of each sector remains constant.
3.3 Measuring competition
The measure of competition used in the main speci￿cation is the price-cost margin or
Lerner Index. This is a standard measure of competition de￿ned as the di⁄erence between
price and marginal cost as a fraction of price. A higher magnitude of the price-cost margin
is associated with lower product market competition.
The price-cost margin was shown by Boone (2000) to perform relatively well as a
re￿ ection of the level of product market competition under a variety of theoretical setups.
In fact, this measure of competition ￿ts well the theoretical characterization of competition
used in this paper. In particular, in the context of the model, the price-cost margin
17is decreasing in market size and increasing in product di⁄erentiation and entry costs.
Moreover, this measure is found by Boone (2000) to be preferable to most other commonly
used measures of competition like the concentration ratio or the inverse of the number of
￿rms.
However, the price-cost margin presents one drawback. It implicitly assumes the ex-
istence of constant returns to scale in production. In particular, the measure is biased
downward (upward) in the presence of increasing (decreasing) returns to scale. The inclu-
sion of sector dummies in the empirical analysis mitigates the consequences of di⁄erent
levels of returns to scale between sectors since it is unlikely that the sector production
technology changes very quickly over time. Additionally, the year dummies would account
for the existence of such changes at the economy level. Besides, the equation of interest is
estimated using the concentration index as an alternative measure of competition in some
speci￿cations and results are consistent with the estimations using the price-cost margin.
See Table D.1 in Appendix D.
3.4 Identi￿cation strategies
One of the main challenges that arise when estimating the impact of product market com-
petition on the use of open-ended contracts is the potential endogeneity of the competi-
tion measure. Endogeneity may be present for two reasons. Firstly, the use of open-ended
contracts in a sector may in￿ uence the entry of other ￿rms, which modi￿es the level of
competition in the sector (this would be endogeneity induced by reverse causality). Sec-
ondly, unobserved variables like technology may in￿ uence both the use of open-ended
contracts and the extent of competition in the sector (in this case, endogeneity would be
motivated by omitted variables). To address endogeneity concerns I propose two di⁄erent
strategies, an instrumental variable approach and a quasi-experiment. Both are based on
changes in legislation that induce arguably exogenous changes in competition.
183.4.1 Instrumental variables: The Regulatory Impact measure
As argued above, using the price-cost margin as a measure of competition is subject to
a potential endogeneity problem. I propose the Regulatory Impact indicator provided by
the OECD as an instrument for the price-cost margin.
The Regulatory Impact indicator measures the extent to which anti-competitive leg-
islation in some service sectors (namely, energy, transport, communications, retail dis-
tribution, business services and ￿nance), impacts manufacturing sectors. The e⁄ect on
each manufacturing sector depends on the extent to which it uses the services produced
by each service sector. The construction of this index is done in two steps: Firstly, in-
formation on barriers to entry, public ownership, vertical integration, market structure
and price controls is collected for the energy, transport, communications, retail distribu-
tion, business services and ￿nance sectors. Secondly, the information is aggregated at the
manufacturing sector level by using the intensity of use of each of those service sectors as
weights. The list of the 25 manufacturing sectors for which this information is available
is displayed in Table B.1. A more detailed description of this indicator can be found in
Conway and Nicoletti (2006). See Tables 1-3 for descriptive statistics on the Regulatory
Impact measure.
Analogously to the measures of competition used in the empirical analysis, the Reg-
ulatory Impact varies at the sector by time dimension. It changes along time because
new anti-competitive laws are promoted in di⁄erent points in time. It presents variation
across sectors because the usage of services is di⁄erent in each manufacturing sector.
The idea underlying the use of the Regulatory Impact as an instrument for product
market competition is that deregulation in the service sectors induces higher competi-
tion in the manufacturing sectors. This fact has been documented in Deardor⁄ (2001)
and Francois and Wooton (2010), among others11. The mechanism behind the positive
10The data on the Regulatory Impact indicator is publicly avail-
able at the Indicators of Product Market Regulation Homepage:
http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3343,en_2649_34323_2367297_1_1_1_1,00.html.
11Many papers support the existence of a positive in￿ uence of deregulation in service sectors on man-
19correlation between deregulation in services and competition in manufacturing is that
deregulation in the service sectors reduces the prices of services which constitute costs
for the manufacturing ￿rms. The decrease in these costs a⁄ects each of the ￿nal product
sectors di⁄erently depending on the relative importance of these types of inputs in the
production process. This the source of cross-sector variation of the instrument.
The decline in anti-competitive regulation in the above-mentioned service sectors is
positively correlated with competition as measured by the price-cost margin in manufac-
turing sectors12. This goes in line the previous argument stated above as well as with
previous literature. Still, this may seem contradictory because less regulation in a ser-
vice sector induces a fall in the price of the services o⁄ered by that sector and therefore
decreases the manufacturing sectors￿costs which will lead to higher price-cost margin,
looking like less competition. However, ￿rms adjust prices to changes in costs, and the
extent of the adjustment of the price-cost margin to changes in costs would capture pre-
cisely the intensity of competition.
Changes in product market regulation in a sector may still be endogenous when ex-
plaining the use of the di⁄erent types of labor contracts within that sector if the gov-
ernment targets both the labor and product markets in one sector simultaneously. In
contrast, changes in regulation in a sector are more likely to be exogenous with respect
to the use of the di⁄erent types of labor contracts in other sectors. In this paper, changes
in regulation in services are used to study labor contracts in manufacturing sectors.
Additionally, the promotion of new laws regarding the above mentioned service sectors
were motivated by a worldwide trend towards economic liberalization of traditionally
protected sectors and it is unlikely that the number of ￿xed-term vs. open-ended contracts
ufacturing sectors. Kerr and Nanda (2007) ￿nd evidence that US banking deregulations led to increased
competition by inducing entry in sectors throught out the economy. In an application to the automo-
bile industry, Gosh and Morita (2002) show that lower communication costs often reduce the degree
of product di⁄erentiation leading to more competition. Smith and Thanassoulis (2008) highlight that
lower competition in the retail sector induces ￿rms in other sectors to concentrate, reducing the level of
competition. Melitz (2003) argues that exposure to trade increases competition in the a⁄ected sectors.
In practice, the decrease in transport costs after the deregulation of the transport sector has increased
exposure to trade in the overall economy.
12This is revealed by the ￿rst stage regression displayed in Table 5.
20in the Spanish manufacturing sectors was somehow correlated with the cause of these
changes.
Moreover, the intensity of use of services by manufacturing sectors is kept ￿xed over
time at the initial level. Hence, we rule out that endogenous changes in the use of
transport, communication, distribution services, etc. by manufacturing sectors may be
driving the results.
3.4.2 Quasi-experiment: The application of EU Directives in Spain
At the end of the 1990￿ s, the Spanish government, following the indications of the Eu-
ropean Union, promoted several laws to liberalize economic activity in sectors such as
energy, post, telecommunications, road and rail transport, ports, and tobacco. The aim
was to apply structural reforms to promote competition as well as to improve the quality
of regulation. In practice, these reforms implied important reductions in the legal barriers
to entry in the a⁄ected sectors.
The energy sector experienced very important legislative changes in 1997. A new law
takes into account EU rules on the electricity single market and lays the foundations
for a free market for electric power generation. Additionally, new laws in the gas sector
eliminated some regulations concerning distribution at the retail level. Speci￿cally, the
percentage of the retail market open to consumer choice goes from 0 to 20 from 1996 to
1997.
The road and rail sector went through an increase in the level of competition from
1997 to 1998. The rail sector continues to be fully owned by public capital. However,
the administration is divided into two di⁄erent entities that compete in the same rail
district in the passenger and freight transports markets and that are required to be more
pro￿table because the EU Directive forces the government to reduce subsidies.
The post and telecom sector was subject to changes in competition legislation between
1998 and 1999. In 1997 a law was promoted intending the full liberalization of the
telecommunications sector in December 1998. However, it was not until January 1999
21that the new law was enforced. The 1997 EU Directive on the liberalization of the postal
services sector translated into the 1998 Spanish Law that liberalized some postal services
starting in 1999. The OECD entry regulation indicator shows that the telephone markets
became fully competitive in terms of entry regulation starting in 1999.
The magnitude of the change in competition in these sectors can be approximated by
the OECD indicator on barriers to entry13. According to this indicator, the barriers to
entry decreased by 96.2% in the energy sector from 1996 to 1997, by 53.3% in the rail and
road sector from 1997 to 1998 and by 85.9% in the post and telecom sector from 1998 to
1999. On the other hand, the airlines and retail distribution are reported to experience
absolutely no change in their barriers to entry during the period of study. Therefore, they
are chosen as control sectors14.
Then, the changes in barriers to entry in the energy, rail and road and post and
telecom sectors are used as exogenous sources of changes in product market competition.
The resulting speci￿cation is equivalent to the one described in equation (1) where Cjt is a
vector that has three components: C1
jt; a dummy equal to one if an individual is employed
in the energy sector in 1997 or after, C2
jt; an indicator equal to one if the individual is
employed in the rail and road sector in 1998 or after and C3
jt; a binary variable equal
to one if the individual is employed in the post and telecom sector in 1999 or after.
Positive (negative) coe¢ cients associated to these three variables are interpreted as more
competition inducing a higher (lower) probability of transition to an open-ended contract.
Additionally, the quasi-experiment speci￿cation allows me to control for individual ￿xed
e⁄ects15.
As argued in section 3.1, the change in competition in the treated sectors indirectly
13The data on barriers to entry by sector is publicly available at the Indicators of Product Market
Regulation Homepage:
http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3343,en_2649_34323_2367297_1_1_1_1,00.html
14There is no information on barriers to entry for the rest of sectors of the economy. As it is not
possible to be sure whether those other sectors belong to the treatment or the control group, they are
excluded from the sample.
15It is not possible to control for individual ￿xed e⁄ects in the instrumental variables estimation due
to lack of variation in the instrument.
22a⁄ected other sectors in the economy, including the control sectors. Thus, the magnitude
of the estimated impact is a lower bound for the total actual impact.
The timing of these reforms was unforeseen. For instance, the OECD Annual Report
(2001) asserts that "full liberalization in this sector [telecommunications] came in Decem-
ber 1998, eleven months after the EU target date but in advance of the extended deadline
that Spain had negotiated". Additionally, incumbents in some sectors were unaware of
the real extent of their application. "In early 1999, the Tribunal assessed substantial ￿nes
against the previous public monopoly, Telef￿nica ￿580 million and 750 million Pesetas [8
million euros] ￿for abuse of dominance in basic and mobile telephony", OECD (2001).
Moreover, placebo tests illustrate that the e⁄ect of the reforms was not anticipated.
The exogenous nature of this quasi-experiment is originated in the Spanish govern-
ment￿ s resistance to the application of the EU anti-competitive Directives. The argument
used by the Spanish government to oppose the timing imposed by the European Union
was that the Spanish economic structure was not ready for this sudden liberalization.
However, external political pressures forced the government to promote the correspond-
ing competition-enhancing laws ahead of schedule.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Databases
Given the nature of the empirical question, it is necessary to combine information at the
individual or ￿rm level, at which the decisions on type of labor contracts are taken, with
information at the sector level, at which product market competition operates.
i) The Spanish Labor Force Survey
The Spanish Labor Force Survey (Encuesta de la Poblaci￿n Activa) regards to families
living in the Spanish territory. The initial sample size is 65000 families by quarter. In
practice, this is reduced to 60000 e⁄ectively interviewed families that include approxi-
23mately 180000 individuals. The survey provides information on individual labor market
status, type of labor contract, duration of labor market status, duration of labor contract,
and many other personal and job characteristics (excluding wage). New information is
collected on a quarterly frequency. Since 1987, the survey has a rotating panel structure
where each family is interviewed a maximum of six consecutive quarters16.
To address the lack of information about wages, individuals in the Labor Force Survey
are assigned average wages from the Continuous Sample of Working Histories, as described
next.
ii) Continuous Sample of Working Histories
The Continuous Sample of Working Histories (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales)
includes register data for almost 1.1 million individuals that were in contact with the
Social Security Administration at the time the information is collected. For a detailed
description of this database see Garc￿a (2008). In this paper, I use the 2004 wave, which
includes individuals who were working, receiving bene￿ts or pensions in 2004. It provides
information on the entire working life histories of the selected individuals back to 1967.
Information refers to individual, job and employer characteristics, including wages, which
I use to construct average wage by sector, time and type of labor contract. These average
wages are then matched to the individuals in the Spanish Labor Force Survey17.
16The panel structure of the data is of key interest for the study of transitions. However the panel
version of the survey does not include information on industry of employment at the 2-digits level while the
cross-section version does. Therefore, I use the panel data resulting from the match of the cross-sections
by means of the algorithm described in JimØnez-Mart￿n and Peracchi (2002). This algorithm matches the
cross-sections of the Spanish Labor Force Survey from 1993 to 2003. This matching procedure replicates
the panel version of the Spanish Labor Force Survey perfectly and allows researchers to have information
on variables that were originally included in the cross-section but not in the panel.
17I performed a separate analysis of the transitions from ￿xed-term to open-ended contracts using the
Continuous Sample of Working Histories. Unfortunately, the information on type of labor contract is
missing for a large proportion of individuals in the early years of the sample and this reduces the reliability
of the estimates. Nevertheless, point estimates are very similar to the ones obtained using the Spanish
Labor Force Survey and are available from the author upon request.
24iii) Business Strategies Survey
The Business Strategies Survey (Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales) is an annual
survey on a representative sample of Spanish manufacturing ￿rms. The reference popula-
tion are ￿rms with 10 or more workers operating in the Spanish territory. It has a panel
structure that covers the period from 1990 to 2006. In the base year, ￿rms were chosen
according to a sampling procedure that assigned weights depending on size. The compo-
sition of the sample has been maintained in all the subsequent years. Newly created ￿rms
have been added each year with the same sampling criteria as in the base year. Firms
are followed even if they split or merge to another ￿rm. The Business Strategies Survey
includes information on 4355 ￿rms with an average number of years in the sample of 12.
It provides data on average characteristics of workers in the ￿rm, ￿rm characteristics,
accounting data, economic sector and some competition measures.
This dataset allows me to complement the analysis at the individual level with an
analysis at the ￿rm level, as well as to compare the results using di⁄erent measures of
competition.
iv) Industrial Enterprise Survey
The Industrial Enterprise Survey (Encuesta Industrial de Empresas) is available yearly
since 1993. It includes information on ￿rms whose main activity has an industrial nature
and which are located in the Spanish territory. Its purpose is to collect information on
structural and productive characteristics of the manufacturing sectors. The ￿rms included
in the sample are representative of the corresponding sector and size cell. It includes
information on employment, revenues, costs, investment and other features at the sector
level.
The accounting information provided in this survey is used to construct the price-
cost margin by sector and year which is used as the main measure of competition in the
empirical analysis.
25v) OECD database
The OECD has developed a wide range of indicators that measure product market regu-
lation by sector. They cover the period 1975-2003 and summarize the status of product
market regulation for 36 di⁄erent sectors in 21 OECD countries. The indicators collect
information on several aspects of anti-competitive regulation. As Conway and Nicoletti
(2006) state it, "these indicators measure the extent to which policy settings promote
or inhibit competition in areas of the product market where competition is viable". In
particular, they include information on barriers to entry, public ownership, vertical in-
tegration, market structure and price controls as well as the impact of anti-competitive
regulation in some service sectors on manufacturing sectors.
This information is used to identify changes in legislation that generate exogenous
variation in the level of competition, which is essential for the empirical strategy.
4.2 Construction of variables
Transitions
The analysis focuses on workers￿probability of transitioning from a ￿xed-term to an
open-ended contract. The dependent variable is constructed using the Spanish Labor
Force Survey and is equal to one if the worker transitions from a ￿xed-term to an open-
ended contract during a given year and zero if the worker stays with a ￿xed-term contract.
There is no contract identi￿er hence, it is not known whether two subsequent contracts are
held in the same ￿rm or not. For this reason, transitions are de￿ned within sector instead
of within ￿rms. Moreover, there appears to be some measurement error because some
contracts exceed the maximum legal duration of three years. I treat those observations
as censored at the legal limit. This solution was also adopted by G￿ell and Petrongolo
(2007).
Price-cost margin
The price-cost margin is de￿ned as price over marginal cost divided by price. How-
ever, in practice there is no data on marginal costs. The standard solution is to proxy
26the marginal cost using unit cost. In particular, the price-cost margin is computed as
production revenue (price by quantity) minus production costs (unit cost by quantity)
divided by production revenue. As quantity appears as common factor in the numera-
tor and denominator, this is equivalent to price minus unit cost divided by price. I use
the accounting data aggregated by sector and year provided in the Industrial Enterprise
Survey to compute this variable.
The price-cost margin has been chosen as the reference measure of competition because
it has been shown to perform well under a variety of theoretical settings and moreover, it
goes in line with the characterization of competition in the model. However, it is computed
by proxying marginal with average costs and it assumes constant returns to scale. Hence,
in order to assure that measurement error in the price-cost margin is not driving the
results, the concentration index is used as an alternative measure of competition in some
speci￿cations with very similar results. See Table D.1 in Appendix D.
Wages
In Spain, ￿xed-term contracts are usually associated to lower wages. Hence, when
studying the determinants of ￿xed-term contracts, it is important to control for wage to
avoid confounding lower wages and lower job security. Given that the majority of wages
are set by collective bargaining, average wages by year, sector and type of labor contract
are considered a good proxy of individual wages. In practice, average wages are computed
using individual register data from the Continuous Sample of Working Histories18.
18The Continuous Sample of Working Histories does not include actual wages but a top and bottom-
coded version of wages. The limits correspond to the minimum and maximum wages subject to taxes
each year. I use the algorithm described in Boldrin, JimØnez-Mart￿n and Peracchi (2004) to recover
actual wages. The estimation of actual wages relies on the assumption that the true distribution of the
logarithm of earnings is a normal distribution where the mean is a linear function of observed individual
and job characteristics. When estimating the mean of the logarithm of earnings, I include as regressors
age and dummies for male, nationality, sector, ￿xed-term contract, region and year. The censored values
are replaced by the estimated conditional mean of wages.
274.3 Sample de￿nition and descriptive statistics
The sample obtained from the Spanish Labor Force Survey includes men aged 16 to 64.
In order to match the yearly frequency of the data on product market competition, I
include each individual￿ s ￿rst and ￿fth interviews, i.e., each individual is included at the
time when she is ￿rst interviewed and in the same quarter of the following year.
For the speci￿cation estimating transitions from ￿xed-term to open-ended employ-
ment, I keep only those workers observed having a ￿xed-term contract at some point in
time. As in traditional linear duration models, I consider exits to states di⁄erent from
permanent employment within the sector as censored at the time of exit. Analogously,
for the speci￿cation estimating transitions to unemployment, I keep only those individu-
als observed having a job at some point in time and consider as censored exits to states
di⁄erent to unemployment.
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics for the sample from the Spanish Labor Force
Survey used in the instrumental variable estimation. It shows that 7% of total observations
are transitions from ￿xed-term to open-ended contracts. The average price-cost margin is
0.065 with a standard deviation of 0.028. The average Regulatory Impact is 0.15 with a
standard deviation of 0.04. Table 2 represents the analogous descriptive statistics for the
sample used in the quasi-experiment analysis. It shows that 6.7% of total observations are
transitions from ￿xed-term to open-ended contracts and that 25% of total observations
are treated.
The sample extracted from the Business Strategies Survey includes all ￿rms whose
degree of diversi￿cation does not exceed the two-digit level of sector aggregation which
represent 91.63% of the sample. This is done for purely practical reasons in order to be
able to assign each ￿rm unequivocally to a single 2-digit sector.
Table 3 displays the descriptive statistics of the sample from the Business Strategies
Survey. The average proportion of salaried workers having open-ended contracts in a ￿rm
is 78.6%. The average price-cost margin is 0.366 with a standard deviation of 0.059. The
average Regulatory Impact is 0.147 with a standard deviation of 0.021.
285 Empirical results
The theoretical model shows that there is an e¢ cient value of the transition rate from
￿xed-term to open-ended contracts and that product market competition will induce more
(less) transitions to open-ended contracts if the actual transition rate is lower (higher)
than the e¢ cient value. The objective of the empirical exercise is to provide an estimate
for the causal impact of product market competition on the use of ￿xed-term versus
open-ended labor contracts. Two di⁄erent estimation strategies are proposed in order
to overcome endogeneity, an instrumental variable strategy and a quasi-experiment. The
instrumental variables analysis is performed using individual data from the Spanish Labor
Force Survey as well as with ￿rm level data from the Business Strategies Survey, while the
quasi-experiment is performed using only individual data from the Spanish Labor Force
Survey19.
5.1 Instrumental variables results
I estimate equation (1), by both OLS and IV using the Regulatory Impact as instrument
for the price-cost margin. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual transi-
tions from a ￿xed-term to a open-ended contract within a sector in a given year and zero
otherwise.
The standard OLS results are displayed in Table 4. The price-cost margin is the
variable used to measure the level of product market competition. When included in
the regression, the price-cost margin is multiplied by minus one to ease interpretation in
terms of competition. Results point at a negative but statistically insigni￿cant relationship
between competition and transitions from ￿xed-term to open-ended employment.
The instrumental variable speci￿cation uses the price-cost margin as measure of com-
petition and the Regulatory Impact indicator as instrument. The ￿rst stage (Table 5)
19The quasi-experiment is not performed using the Business Strategies Survey because the sectors
a⁄ected in the quasi-experiment are not covered by the Business Strategies Survey.
29re￿ ects a positive correlation between liberalization in the service sectors and competition
in the industries making use of those services20. Table 6 displays the second stage results.
Comparison of Table 4 and Table 6 evidences the necessity of accounting for endo-
geneity in this set up. OLS induced a positive bias in the coe¢ cient that one can interpret
according to the two potential sources of endogeneity. Firstly, industries where transitions
from ￿xed-term to open-ended employment often occur may be targeted by potential en-
trants that plan to compete by using cheaper labor contracts. Secondly, the introduction
of technology that standardizes the production process may induce less transitions to
open-ended employment because that technology reduces di⁄erences in productivity be-
tween workers as well as less competition because the necessary investment in technology
acts as a barrier to entry of new ￿rms.
Comparing the columns in Table 6, one ￿nds that the sequential introduction of time
and sector dummies highly modi￿es the coe¢ cient towards more negative values. This
gives us some intuition on the importance of accounting for common time trends as well
as time invariant industry characteristics in this context. The application of weights such
that changes in sector size are taken into account has only a small impact on the magnitude
of the coe¢ cient. If anything, the estimation using weights re￿ ects a slightly weaker
negative impact. This happens because the industries where the identifying variation
occurs expand21.
The coe¢ cient from the most complete speci￿cation including time dummies, sector
dummies and weights (column 4) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the
level of product market competition decreases the probability of becoming open-ended for
a ￿xed-term worker by more than 30% 22.
20All regressions ful￿ll the criterium that the F-statistic of the excluded instruments is bigger than the
corresponding Stock and Yogo critical value so the instrument is not weak.
21This is coherent with the results obtained in the previous literature that shows that more competition
induces higher employment.
22The standard deviation of the price-cost margin is 0.028. Multiplied by the coe¢ cient, -0.757, this
gives the average absolute change in the proportion of open-ended workers, which is -0.021. This is
equivalent to a decrease of 30.286% in the average probability of transition.
This is a lower bound for the true e⁄ect because one expects that the estimated e⁄ect becomes stronger
once individual ￿xed e⁄ects are included. This occurs because the omission of individual time invariant
30The coe¢ cients associated to the individual controls on the equation for the proba-
bility of transitioning from ￿xed-term to open-ended contracts are shown in Appendix B.
They are fairly standard, and consistent with previous studies using logit estimates (see
Alba, 1998) as well as competing risks duration models (see G￿ell and Petrongolo, 2007).
Likewise G￿ell and Petrongolo (2007), results show two pronounced spikes at one and
three years duration, coinciding with the legal limit for ￿xed-term contracts.
I ￿nd that the level of product market competition increases the proportion of ￿xed-
term contracts that are not converted into open-ended ones within a sector. This is the
closest one can set to a "pure" competition e⁄ect. However, competition may have an
indirect impact on type of labor contract by inducing some individuals to move between
sectors. As moving to a new sector is usually associated with a new ￿xed-term contract,
this e⁄ect can be attributed to the change in competition in the sector of origin. I thus
estimate an additional speci￿cation in which each individual is assigned to the sector
where they are initially hired under a ￿xed-term contract, irrespective of whether they
later switch sector or not. This allows to shed some light on the relative importance of
the direct e⁄ect with respect to the indirect e⁄ect through sector switching. A dummy for
switchers and an interaction of switcher and the competition measure are added to the
original speci￿cation. I ￿nd that the impact of competition is not statistically di⁄erent
between the group of switchers and non-switchers. If anything, the impact of competition
is stronger in the group of switchers. As mentioned earlier, switching sectors reduces the
probability of getting an open-ended contract in the period immediately after the switch.
Consistently, results show that getting a open-ended contract after a ￿xed-term contract
is lower for switchers. See Table D.2 in Appendix D.
In the estimation performed using the Business Strategies Survey, the OLS results
displayed in the ￿rst panel of Table 7 point at a negative impact of competition on the
unobserved characteristics in the group of controls biases the coe¢ cients for the other controls towards
zero. Some evidence on this fact is discussed in section 5.2. Note that it is not possible to include individ-
ual ￿xed e⁄ects in the instrumental variable speci￿cation because the instrument weakens signi￿cantly
once individual ￿xed e⁄ects are included.
31proportion of ￿xed-term contracts. When comparing those results with those from the
instrumental variable estimation (second panel), one observes that the OLS results induce
a bias towards zero. In OLS and IV estimations, the magnitude of the e⁄ect becomes
stronger when time and sector dummies are included but it becomes slightly weaker
when weights are applied. Therefore, the sign of the coe¢ cient and the direction of the
di⁄erent biases are coherent with the speci￿cation using the Labor Force Survey. When
￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects are included (column 5), the estimated impact gets weaker although it
is still negative and very signi￿cant23. Table C.2 displays the estimated coe¢ cients for
the control variables.
The coe¢ cient for the most complete estimation including time dummies, sector dum-
mies, weights and ￿rm ￿xed e⁄ects (column 5) indicates that a one standard deviation
increase in the level of product market competition decreases the proportion of open-ended
workers in the ￿rm by more than 18%24.
5.2 Quasi-experiment results
The results obtained by making use of the application of competition-enhancing EU Di-
rectives as a quasi-experiment are displayed in Table 8. The estimated coe¢ cients for
the impact of a rise in competition motivated by a decrease in legal barriers to entry on
the probability of transitioning from ￿xed-term to open-ended employment are consis-
tent across the three di⁄erent treated sectors as well as with the instrumental variable
speci￿cation. A stronger negative impact appears after the introduction of time and sec-
tor dummies while weighting the observations does not change the estimated coe¢ cients
signi￿cantly.
23The most complete speci￿cation (column 5) is the only one for which the instrument is not weak
according to the Stock and Yogo test. In this case, the ￿rst stage is showing a positive correlation
between the price-cost margin and the Regulatory Impact. This is coherent with the results obtained
with individual data.
24The standard deviation of the price-cost margin is 0.059. Multiplied by the coe¢ cient, -2.464, this
gives the average absolute change in the proportion of permanent workers, which is -0.145. This is
equivalent to a decrease of 18.45% in the average proportion of permanent workers.
32As expected, the estimation including individual ￿xed e⁄ects increases the magnitude
of the coe¢ cients substantially. This happens because individuals with "very bad" unob-
served characteristics would not become open-ended even if the level of competition was
very low. Moreover, individuals with "very good" unobserved characteristics would not
stay under a ￿xed-term contract even if the level of competition was very high. Hence,
controlling for individual time-invariant characteristics results in a stronger estimate for
the negative impact of product market competition on the probability of the transition
from ￿xed-term to open-ended employment. This suggests that the ￿nal coe¢ cient ob-
tained in the instrumental variables speci￿cation is a lower bound of the true e⁄ect.
In order to interpret the magnitude of the results, I also estimate an equation in which
the competition measure is the interaction of a dummy for working in a treated sector in
the post-treatment period with the proportion of removed legal barriers to entry in each
sector according to the OECD25. This leads to a coe¢ cient of -0.12, which indicates that
the elimination of legal barriers to entry (the change from legal monopoly to free entry)
induced a decrease of 12% in the probability of becoming open-ended for workers hired
under ￿xed-term contracts. See Table D.3 in Appendix D.
Bertrand et al. (2004) state that di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences standard errors could be
understated due to serial correlation in the outcome of study. In order to address that
concern, I use, in addition to standard cluster mentioned above, two dimensional cluster
where one dimension is sector-time cells and the other one is the individual. This takes into
account the correlation of errors within individuals over time as well as the correlation
within sector-time cells which is the level of aggregation of the competition measures.
Results show that there is essentially no change in the level of signi￿cance of the estimates.
See Table D.4 in Appendix D.
As Imbens (2004) suggests, in the context of the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences approach
it is essential to provide some support for the validity of two assumptions: (i) overlap
25According to the OECD, barriers to entry decrease by 96% in the energy sector from 1996 to 1997,
by 86% in the post and telecom sector from 1998 to 1999 and by 53% in the rail and road sector from
1997 to 1998.
33in the covariate distributions and (ii) exogeneity or unconfoundedness assumptions. To
address (i), Table 2 shows that the distribution of the covariates for workers employed
in the treated sectors and the distribution of the covariates for workers employed in the
untreated sectors present signi￿cant overlap. With respect to (ii), Figure 3 presents some
evidence that the pre-treatment trend was quite similar between treated and untreated
sectors. Additionally, I estimate the treatment e⁄ect on a pre-treatment variable. In
particular, the regressions address the impact of the treatment on transitions from ￿xed-
term to open-ended contract a year before the treatment actually took place. The results
of this placebo test are displayed in Table 11. The "placebo" e⁄ect is not signi￿cant on
average.
Finally, the number of degrees of freedom in the quasi-experimental regressions is
39 (or 44 when individual ￿xed-e⁄ects are excluded). This could raise some concerns
about whether the number of clusters is small to provide reliable estimates. To address
these concerns, I perform bootstrap over clusters and show the coe¢ cients arising from
each iteration in Figure 4. The coe¢ cients arising from each interation are found to
be consistently negative and their magnitudes are very similar. This assures that no
particular clusters of observations are leading the results.
5.3 Sector switching results
Analogously to Goldberg et al. (1999), I use sector switching as an additional measure of
job instability. The baseline speci￿cation can be written as in equation (1). The outcome
of interest, yijt, equals one if individual i in sector j at time t switches sector of employment
and zero otherwise. The vector Xijt contains the set of individual characteristics listed in
section 3.1 where ￿xed-term contract duration dummies are substituted by job duration
dummies in years and an indicator for ￿xed-term contract is added. Moreover, Wijt
represents now the sector-year average wages in place of the di⁄erence in average wage
between open-ended and ￿xed-term contracts.
Three complementary sector assignment methods provide evidence on how competition
34a⁄ects the probability of sector switching. First, each individual is assigned to the sector
where he is initially employed even if he switches sector. This allows to draw a conclusion
regarding how changes in competition in one sector induces workers to move to other
sectors. Second, individuals are assigned to the sector where they are ￿nally employed
even if they move sector. Following this estimation, one deduces how the probability
of moving from other sectors to a particular sector changes according to competition in
the receiving sector. Third, workers are assigned to the sector where they are actually
employed in each period. Using this sector assignment method, one can infer how sector
switching is a⁄ected by di⁄erences in the level of competition between sectors.
Results are displayed in Table 9. They show that when the level of competition
increases in one sector, it is less likely that workers in that sector transition to other sectors
and it is more probable that workers in other sectors move to that sector. Additionally,
workers switch sectors to a greater extent when the di⁄erences in competition between
sectors widen. In particular, a one percentage point increase in the level of competition in
a sector reduces the probability that the average worker in that sector moves to a di⁄erent
sector by over 22%26, while it increases the probability that a worker in a di⁄erent sector
moves to that sector by over 36%27. Additionally, a one percentage point rise in the
di⁄erence in competition between two sectors increases the probability that a worker
switches sector by over 12%28. In general, one expects that an upturn (reduction) in the
level of competition in a sector provokes an in￿ ow (out￿ ow) of workers into (from) that
sector.
26The standard deviation of the price-cost margin is 0.039. Multiplied by the coe¢ cient, -0.075, this
gives the average absolute change in the proportion of switchers, which is -0.003. This is equivalent to a
decrease of 22.307% in the average probability of sector switching.
27The standard deviation of the price-cost margin is 0.039. Multiplied by the coe¢ cient, 0.124, this
gives the average absolute change in the proportion of switchers, which is 0.005. This is equivalent to a
decrease of 36.875% in the average probability of sector switching.
28The standard deviation of the price-cost margin is 0.039. Multiplied by the coe¢ cient, 0.125, this
gives the average absolute change in the proportion of switchers, which is 0.002. This is equivalent to a
decrease of 12.536% in the average probability of sector switching.
355.4 Unemployment results
The probability that a worker becomes unemployed constitutes another dimension of job
instability. It is also very related to the type of labor contract because ￿xed-term con-
tracts are associated with a higher probability of job separation. However, keeping a
worker under a ￿xed-term contract and discarding the worker could potentially be sub-
stitute strategies for the ￿rm. Therefore, the impact of product market competition on
unemployment is unknown a priori. The speci￿cation of interest is very similar to the
one described by equation (1) where the outcome of interest, yijt, is now equal to one if
individual i working in sector j at time t becomes unemployed in a given year. The set
of individual characteristics, Xijt, includes, in addition to the controls in equation (1), a
dummy for ￿xed-term contract and, in substitution of ￿xed-term contract duration dum-
mies, job duration dummies in years. Wjt stands for sector-year average wages (instead
of the di⁄erence in average wage between open-ended and ￿xed-term labor contracts) and
it is included in order to proxy the opportunity cost of keeping the worker.
The results obtained from the instrumental variable speci￿cation are shown in table
1029. More product market competition induces a rise in the probability of becoming
unemployed. An increase in competition by one standard deviation provokes a rise in the
probability of becoming unemployed over 56% 30.
This conclusion is in line with the theoretical model proposed by Amable and Gatti
(2004) in which an increase in product market competition boosts the separation rate.
29When estimating the probability of job separation, there is no speci￿cation using the weights because
job separation is one channel through which the sector composition of the economy changes. Hence, we
are already addressing sector composition changes explicitly.
30The standard deviation of the price-cost margin is 0.039. Multiplied by the coe¢ cient, -0.181, this
gives the average absolute change in the proportion of unemployed, which is 0.007. This is equivalent to
an increase of 55.818% in the average probability of job separation.
366 Conclusion
There is a very active literature on the impact of product market competition on labor
market outcomes. This paper contributes to this literature by estimating the impact of
competition on job instability as measured by the probability of holding an open-ended
contract.
I propose a theoretical model that is, to the best of my knowledge, the ￿rst one to
shed light on the relationship between competition and type of labor contract. In the
context of the model, competition is characterized by market size, product di⁄erentiation
and entry cost. Open-ended contracts di⁄er from ￿xed-term contracts in the probability
of separation and the dismissal cost. The model has a number of predictions that are
consistent with the data: (i) Fixed-term and open-ended contracts coexist in all sectors,
(ii) Open-ended workers are more productive than ￿xed-term workers, and (iii) Product
market competition alters the degree of use of ￿xed-term and open-ended contracts. In
particular, the model indicates that when the transition rate to open-ended contracts is
low (high), more competition induces a rise (decrease) in the proportion of ￿xed-term
contracts.
The empirical analysis focuses on Spain, which is the country with the highest inci-
dence of ￿xed-term contracts in Europe. Employment relationships in Spain traditionally
start under ￿xed-term contracts and hence, the majority of the individuals in the Spanish
labor market are subject to this type of contract at some point in their working lifes.
Combining data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey, the Continuous Sample of Work-
ing Histories, the Business Strategies Survey and the Industrial Enterprise Survey, job
instability is shown to rise with competition. The result is robust to the use of di⁄erent
estimation strategies, databases, and measures of competition.
The empirical strategy makes use of changes in legislation as a source of exogenous
variation in the level of product market competition in order to overcome endogeneity
concerns. Exogeneity originates in (i) The impact of deregulation in service sectors on
manufacturing sectors, and (ii) The enforcement of the EU Directives enhancing compe-
37tition in Spain.
Overall, the results show that product market competition has a signi￿cant impact on
job instability. In particular, one standard deviation increase in product market compe-
tition as measured by the price-cost margin induces a fall in the probability of a worker
transitioning from a ￿xed-term to a open-ended contract in a given year over 30%, a
reduction in the probability that the average worker in that sector moves to a di⁄erent
sector by over -22%, an upturn in the probability that a worker in a di⁄erent sector moves
to that sector by over 36%, and an increase in the probability of a worker becoming unem-
ployed of over 56%. The estimated impact of competition on the type of labor contract is
likely a lower bound on the true total e⁄ect. This happens because competition can also
lead to changes in the type of labor contract for individuals who are induced to switch
sector. As switching induces a lower probability of transitioning to a open-ended contract,
the total e⁄ect would be higher.
Thus, the evidence is consistent with a direct contemporaneous causal e⁄ect of prod-
uct market competition on job instability. However, the long run e⁄ects of changes in
competition may be di⁄erent from the ones found for the short run. For instance, if higher
job instability induced by increases in competition allows ￿rms to better screen the most
productive workers, those may enjoy more stable positions in the long run. This question
is left for future research.
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This graph plots average proportion of ￿xed-term over total number of labor contracts by year in
Spain. Data is drawn from the Eurostat. The data is publicly available at the Eurostat Statistics web-
site: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database. The
period included is 1987-2009.
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Mining (1%) Medical equipment (25%)
Electronic material (50%) Recycling (75%)
Agriculture (99%)
This graph displays the evolution of the average proportion of ￿xed-term contracts over time in
￿ve sectors. These ￿ve sectors represent the key percentiles of the distribution of average proportion of
￿xed-term contracts by sector. Data is drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey. The sample includes
contracted workers in the mining, medical equipment, electronic material, recycling and agriculture sectors
from 1992 to 2007.
45Figure 3: Time trends in the proportion of ￿xed-term over total
employment for the treated and untreated sectors in the quasi-
















































This graph displays the time trends for the average proportion of ￿xed-term over total number of labor
contracts in the treated and the untreated sectors in the quasi-experiment estimation using the Spanish
Labor Force Survey. The treated sectors are energy, rail&road and post&telecom and the untreated
sectors are airlines and retail distribution. Data is drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey. The
sample includes men aged 16 to 64 with a ￿xed-term contract, who have no seasonal jobs (the same
sample that is used in the quasi-experiment estimation).
46Figure 4: Bootstrap estimated coe¢ cients for the quasi-experiment
using the Spanish Labor Force Survey
This graph represents the estimated coe¢ cients resulting from 50 random draws from the sample
of clusters in the quasi-experiment estimation. The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual
transitions from ￿xed-term to open-ended employment within a sector in a given year, and zero otherwise.
The measures of competition are a dummy for working in the energy sector in 1997 or after, a dummy
for working in the rail&road sector in 1998 or after and a dummy for working in the post&telecom
sector in 1999 or after. The coe¢ cients are marked with * if the level of signi￿cance is between 5%
and 10%, ** if the level of signi￿cance is between 1% and 5% and *** if the level of signi￿cance is less
than 1%. The regression includes controls for individual and job characteristics (age, married, household
head, dummies for region of residence, high-school graduate, university graduate, number of coworkers,
dummies for duration of the ￿xed-term contract in years and quarter dummies), year and industry of
employment dummies, as well as individual ￿xed-e⁄ects. Individuals are weighted according to the ratio
between the number of workers in their industry one year before the date of the interview and the number
of workers in their industry at the time of the interview. The sample is drawn from the Spanish Labor
Force Survey and includes men aged 16 to 64 with a ￿xed-term contract who have no seasonal jobs over
the period 1993 to 2003. The industries included are energy, rail&road, post&telecom, airline and retail.
The airline and retail industries serve as controls. Errors are clustered by sector-year.
47Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the instrumental variables es-
timation (Labor Force Survey)
Mean Sd Min Max
Transition to open-ended contract 0.07 0.256 0 1
- Price-cost margin -0.065 0.028 -0.269 0.045
- Regulatory Impact -0.15 0.04 -0.546 -0.099
Age 29.079 9.588 16 64
Married 0.339 0.473 0 1
Household head 0.24 0.427 0 1
High school grad 0.708 0.455 0 1
University grad 0.073 0.26 0 1
Spanish citizen 0.991 0.092 0 1
Number of coworkers 54.335 35.606 1 100
One year ￿xed-term contract duration 0.32 0.467 0 1
Two years ￿xed-term contract duration 0.082 0.274 0 1
Three years ￿xed-term contract duration 0.028 0.165 0 1





The sample is drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey and includes men aged 16 to 64 with a
￿xed-term contract who have no seasonal jobs. It comprises the period from 1993 to 2003. The industries
included are listed in table B.1. Sample size is 31737.
48Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the quasi-experiment (Labor
Force Survey)
Full sample Treated sectors Control sectors
Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
Transition to open-ended contract 0.067 0.25 0.072 0.259 0.063 0.242
Energy after 1997 0.023 0.15 0.051 0.219 0 0
Rail&road after 1998 0.174 0.379 0.381 0.486 0 0
Post&telecom after 1999 0.053 0.223 0.115 0.319 0 0
Age 29.612 9.47 33.045 9.834 26.709 8.085
Married 0.35 0.477 0.501 0.5 0.223 0.416
Household head 0.329 0.47 0.473 0.499 0.206 0.405
High school grad 0.725 0.447 0.663 0.473 0.777 0.416
University grad 0.064 0.246 0.061 0.24 0.067 0.25
Spanish citizen 0.99 0.099 0.988 0.108 0.992 0.09
Number of coworkers 40.352 36.855 44.006 34.557 37.261 38.426
One year ￿xed-term contract duration 0.291 0.454 0.308 0.462 0.277 0.447
Two years ￿xed-term contract duration 0.089 0.284 0.094 0.291 0.085 0.278
Three years ￿xed-term contract duration 0.025 0.157 0.03 0.172 0.021 0.143
Open-ended vs. ￿xed-term wage di⁄erence 49800.34 24010.26 60302.18 28809.37 40916.8 13781.89
There are 9667 observations in total, 4430 in the treated sectors and 5237 in the untreated sectors.
The sample is drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey and includes men aged 16 to 64 with a
￿xed-term contract who have no seasonal jobs over the period 1993 to 2003. The industries included are
energy, rail&road, post&telecom, airline and retail. The airline and retail industries serve as controls.
49Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the instrumental variables es-
timation (Business Strategies Survey)
Mean Sd Min Max
Proportion of open-ended workers 0.786 0.247 0 1
- Price cost margin -0.366 0.059 -0.504 -0.179
- Regulatory Impact -0.147 0.021 -0.2 -0.099
Number of workers 225.885 546.304 1 14390
Percentage of university grads (long degree) 3.82 6.358 0 88
Percentage of university grads (short degree) 5.096 7.945 0 100
Percentage of part-time workers 1.602 6.75 0 100
Blue over white collar workers 0.37 2.823 0 216
Wages over production 0.287 0.239 0.013 12.569
Training expenditures per worker 17.593 100.917 0 3838.965
Worker compensations over production 0.287 0.239 0.013 12.569
Merged ￿rm 0.016 0.126 0 1
Split ￿rm 0.011 0.103 0 1
Individual entrepreneur 0.393 0.488 0 1
R&D over production 0.007 0.023 0 0.637
Public capital over total capital 1.588 11.463 0 100
Year 1992 2003
Sector 1 19
The number of observations is 18370. The sample is drawn from the Business Strategies Survey
and includes ￿rms whose level of diversi￿cation does not exceed one industry as de￿ned by the 2-digit
classi￿cation over the period 1992 to 2006. The industries included are listed in table C.1.
50Table 4: Estimation by ordinary least squares (Labor Force Sur-
vey)
basic year sector weighted
Dep var: Transition to open-ended (1) (2) (3) (4)
- Price-cost margin -.054 0.001 -.036 -.033
(0.067) (0.054) (0.125) (0.127)
Number of observations 31043 31043 31043 31043
R2 0.141 0.148 0.149 0.149
The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual transitions from a ￿xed-term to open-ended
employment within a sector in a given year, and zero otherwise. The measure of competition is the
price-cost margin multiplied by minus one. The coe¢ cients are marked with * if the level of signi￿cance
is between 5% and 10%, ** if the level of signi￿cance is between 1% and 5% and *** if the level of
signi￿cance is less than 1%. The basic regression includes controls on individual and job characteristics
(age, married, household head, dummies for region of residence, high-school graduate, university graduate,
number of coworkers, dummies for duration of the ￿xed-term contract in years and quarter dummies) .
The second column adds year dummies to the basic regression. The third column includes, in addition
to the variables in column 2, dummies for industry of employment. Finally, column 4 displays the results
when individuals are weighted according to the ratio between the number of workers in their industry
one year before the date of the interview and the number of workers in their industry at the time of
the interview. The sample is drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey and includes men aged 16 to
64 with a ￿xed-term contract who have no seasonal jobs over the period 1993 to 2003. The industries
included are listed in table B.1. The price-cost margin is obtained from the Industrial Enterprise Survey.
Errors are clustered by sector-year.
51Table 5: First stage (Labor Force Survey)
basic year sector weighted
Dep var: - Price-cost margin (1) (2) (3) (4)
- Regulatory Impact 0.362 0.45 0.265 0.268
(0.054)￿￿￿ (0.063)￿￿￿ (0.055)￿￿￿ (0.055)￿￿￿
Number of observations 31043 31043 31043 31043
R2 0.349 0.459 0.872 0.871
F-statistic of excluded instruments 45.362 52.368 23.296 24.047
The dependent variable is minus the price-cost margin. The instrument for which the coe¢ cient
is displayed is minus the Regulatory Impact Indicator. The coe¢ cients are marked with * if the level
of signi￿cance is between 5% and 10%, ** if the level of signi￿cance is between 1% and 5% and *** if
the level of signi￿cance is less than 1%. The basic regression includes controls on individual and job
characteristics (age, married, household head, dummies for region of residence, high-school graduate,
university graduate, number of coworkers, dummies for duration of the ￿xed-term contract in years and
quarter dummies). The second column adds year dummies to the basic regression. The third column
includes, in addition to the variables in column 2, dummies for industry of employment. Finally, column
4 displays the results when individuals are weighted according to the ratio between the number of workers
in their industry one year before the date of the interview and the number of workers in their industry at
the time of the interview. The sample is drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey and includes men
aged 16 to 64 with a ￿xed-term contract who have no seasonal jobs over the period 1993 to 2003. The
price-cost margin is obtained from the Industrial Enterprise Survey. The Regulatory Impact Indicator is
drawn from the OECD database. The industries included are listed in table B.1. Errors are clustered by
sector-year. The F-statistics of the excluded instrument are bigger than the critical values provided by
Stock and Yogo (2005) which indicates that the instrument is not weak.
52Table 6: Estimation by instrumental variables (Labor Force Sur-
vey)
basic year sector weighted
Dep var: Transition to open-ended (1) (2) (3) (4)
- Price-cost margin 0.658 0.093 -.802 -.771
(0.171)￿￿￿ (0.069) (0.341)￿￿ (0.335)￿￿
Number of observations 31043 31043 31043 31043
R2 0.135 0.148 0.148 0.148
The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual transitions from ￿xed-term to open-ended
employment within a sector in a given year, and zero otherwise. The measure of competition is the price-
cost margin multiplied by minus one. This is instrumented using the Regulatory Impact. The coe¢ cients
are marked with * if the level of signi￿cance is between 5% and 10%, ** if the level of signi￿cance is
between 1% and 5% and *** if the level of signi￿cance is less than 1%. The basic regression includes
controls on individual and job characteristics (age, married, household head, dummies for region of
residence, high-school graduate, university graduate, number of coworkers, dummies for duration of the
￿xed-term contract in years and quarter dummies). The second column adds year dummies to the basic
regression. The third column includes, in addition to the variables in column 2, dummies for industry
of employment. Finally, column 4 displays the results when individuals are weighted according to the
ratio between the number of workers in their industry one year before the date of the interview and the
number of workers in their industry at the time of the interview. The sample is drawn from the Spanish
Labor Force Survey and includes men aged 16 to 64 with a ￿xed-term contract who have no seasonal jobs
over the period 1993 to 2003. The price-cost margin is obtained from the Industrial Enterprise Survey.
The Regulatory Impact is drawn from the OECD database. The industries included are listed in table
B.1. Errors are clustered by sector-year.
53Table 7: Business Strategies Survey results
Estimation by Ordinary Least Squares
basic year sector weights ￿rm fe
Dep var: Proportion of open-ended (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
- Price-cost margin -0.205 -0.252 -0.377 -0.371 -0.366
(0.062)￿￿￿ (0.058)￿￿￿ (0.118)￿￿￿ (0.119)￿￿￿ (0.104)￿￿￿
Number of observations 17705 17705 17705 17705 17705
Estimation by Instrumental Variables
basic year sector weights ￿rm fe
Dep var: Proportion of open-ended (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
- Price-cost margin 3.623 1.322 -5.098 -5.999 -2.464
(17.341) (0.881) (3.567) (4.884) (1.199)￿￿
Number of observations 17705 17705 17705 17705 17417
The dependent variable is the proportion of open-ended over total contracted workers. The measure
of competition is average price-cost margin in the industry multiplied by minus one. This is instrumented
using the Regulatory Impact. The coe¢ cients are marked with * if the level of signi￿cance is between 5%
and 10%, ** if the level of signi￿cance is between 1% and 5% and *** if the level of signi￿cance is less
than 1%. The basic regression includes controls on workers and ￿rm characteristics (number of workers,
percentage of engineers and college graduates -separating long and short degrees-, percentage of workers
with intermediate education, percentage of part-time permanent workers, ratio of blue over white collar
workers, wages over production, workers training expenditures over production, worker compensations
over production, merged ￿rm, split ￿rm, individual entrepreneur, R&D over production and percentage
of public capital). The second column adds year dummies to the basic regression. The third column
includes, in addition to the variables in column 2, dummies for industry of employment. Column 4
displays the results when ￿rms are weighted according to the ratio between the number of workers in
their industry one year before the date of the interview and the number of workers in their industry
at the time of the interview. Finally, column 5 is estimated including ￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ects. The sample is
drawn from the Business Strategies Survey and comprises ￿rms whose level of diversi￿cation does not
exceed one industry as de￿ned by the 2-digit classi￿cation over the period 1992 to 2006. The industries
included are listed in table C.1. The price-cost margin is obtained from the Business Strategies Survey.
The Regulatory Impact is drawn from the OECD database. Errors are clustered by sector-year. The
F statistic of the excluded instrument in the ￿rst stage corresponding to the last column estimation is
25.38. This ￿gure is well over the critial value provided by Stock and Yogo (2005) which indicates that
the instrument is not weak.
54Table 8: Quasi-experiment (Labor Force Survey)
basic year sector weighted ind fe
Dep var: Transition to open-ended (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Energy after 1997 0.02 -.026 -.046 -.050 -.197
(0.017) (0.014)￿ (0.026)￿ (0.026)￿￿ (0.029)￿￿￿
Rail&road after 1998 0.015 -.010 -.022 -.021 -.040
(0.012) (0.01) (0.009)￿￿ (0.009)￿￿ (0.007)￿￿￿
Post&telecom after 1999 0.032 -.026 -.021 -.025 -.127
(0.02) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.067)￿
Number of observations 9623 9623 9623 9623 7191
R2 0.163 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.255
The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual transitions from ￿xed-term to open-ended
employment within a sector in a given year, and zero otherwise. The measures of competition are a
dummy for working in the energy sector in 1997 or after, a dummy for working in the rail&road sector in
1998 or after and, a dummy for working in the post&telecom sector in 1999 or after. The coe¢ cients are
marked with * if the level of signi￿cance is between 5% and 10%, ** if the level of signi￿cance is between
1% and 5% and *** if the level of signi￿cance is less than 1%. The basic regression includes controls
on individual and job characteristics (age, married, household head, dummies for region of residence,
high-school graduate, university graduate, number of coworkers, dummies for duration of the ￿xed-term
contract in years and quarter dummies). The second column adds year dummies to the basic regression.
The third column includes, in addition to the variables in column 2, dummies for industry of employment.
Column 4 displays the results when individuals are weighted according to the ratio between the number
of workers in their industry one year before the date of the interview and the number of workers in their
industry at the time of the interview. Finally, column 5 adds individual ￿xed-e⁄ects. The sample is
drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey and comprises men aged 16 to 64 with a ￿xed-term contract
who have no seasonal jobs over the period 1993 to 2003. The industries included are energy, rail&road,
post&telecom, airline and retail. The airline and retail industries serve as controls. Errors are clustered
by sector-year.
55Table 9: Probability of switching industry (Labor Force Survey)
Initial sector
basic year sector
Dep var: Sector switching (1) (2) (3)
- Price-cost margin 0.061 0.03 -.075
(0.016)￿￿￿ (0.012)￿￿ (0.048)
Number of observations 85364 85364 85364
R2 0.031 0.033 0.034
Final sector
basic year sector
Dep var: Sector switching (1) (2) (3)
- Price-cost margin 0.058 0.03 0.124
(0.014)￿￿￿ (0.013)￿￿ (0.06)￿￿
Number of observations 85364 85364 85364
R2 0.031 0.033 0.034
Actual sector
basic year sector
Dep var: Sector switching (1) (2) (3)
- Price-cost margin 0.057 0.03 0.125
(0.014)￿￿￿ (0.013)￿￿ (0.061)￿￿
Number of observations 85364 85364 85364
R2 0.031 0.033 0.034
The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual switches industry in a given year, and
zero otherwise. The measure of competition is the price-cost margin multiplied by minus one. This is
instrumented using the Regulatory Impact. The coe¢ cients are marked with * if the level of signi￿cance is
between 5% and 10%, ** if the level of signi￿cance is between 1% and 5% and *** if the level of signi￿cance
is less than 1%. The ￿rst panel displays the results for the estimation where individuals are assigned
to their initial industry of employment irrespective of whether they switch sector or not. The second
panel shows the estimations arising when individuals are assigned to their ￿nal sector of employment
irrespective of whether they switch sector or not. And, the third panel, presents the results for the
estimation in which individuals are assigned to their actual industry of employment. The basic regression
56includes controls on individual and job characteristics (age, married, household head, dummies for region
of residence, high-school graduate, university graduate, number of coworkers, dummies for duration of
the job, an indicator for having a ￿xed-term contract, average wage by sector-year and quarter dummies)
The second column adds year dummies to the basic regression. Finally, the third column includes, in
addition to the variables in column 2, dummies for industry of employment. The sample is drawn from
the Spanish Labor Force Survey and includes men aged 16 to 64 with a non seasonal job over the period
1993 to 2003. The price-cost margin is obtained from the Industrial Enterprise Survey. The Regulatory
Impact is drawn from the OECD database. The industries included are listed in table B.1. Errors are
clustered by sector-year. The F test of the excluded instrument in the ￿rst stage corresponding to the
last column estimations are 31.03, 31.45 and 31.33 respectively. These ￿gures are clearly over the critical
values provided by Stock and Yogo (2005) which indicates that the instrument is not weak.
57Table 10: Probability of becoming unemployed (Labor Force Sur-
vey)
Estimation by ordinary least squares
basic year sector
Dep var: Transitions to unemployment (1) (2) (3)
- Price-cost margin -.012 0.001 0.102
(0.011) (0.009) (0.028)￿￿￿
Number of observations 86447 86447 86447
R2 0.121 0.124 0.124
Estimation by instrumental variables
basic year sector
Dep var: Transitions to unemployment (1) (2) (3)
- Price-cost margin -.073 -.005 0.181
(0.017)￿￿￿ (0.013) (0.066)￿￿￿
Number of observations 86447 86447 86447
R2 0.121 0.124 0.124
The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual becomes unemployed in a given year, and
zero otherwise. The measure of competition is the price-cost margin multiplied by minus one. This is
instrumented using the Regulatory Impact. The coe¢ cients are marked with * if the level of signi￿cance is
between 5% and 10%, ** if the level of signi￿cance is between 1% and 5% and *** if the level of signi￿cance
is less than 1%. The basic regression includes controls on individual and job characteristics (age, married,
household head, dummies for region of residence, high-school graduate, university graduate, number of
coworkers, dummies for duration of the job, an indicator for having a ￿xed-term contract, average wage
by sector-year and quarter dummies) The second column adds year dummies to the basic regression.
Finally, the third column includes, in addition to the variables in column 2, dummies for industry of
employment. The sample is drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey and includes men aged 16 to
64 with a non-seasonal job over the period 1993 to 2003. The price-cost margin is obtained from the
Industrial Enterprise Survey. The Regulatory Impact drawn from the OECD database. The industries
included are listed in table B.1. Errors are clustered by sector-year. The F statistic of the excluded
instrument in the ￿rst stage corresponding to the last column estimation is 31.56. This ￿gure is clearly
over the critical value provided by Stock and Yogo (2005) which indicates that the instrument is not
weak.
58Table 11: Placebo quasi-experiment (Labor Force Survey)
basic year sector weighted ind fe
Dep var: Transition to open-ended (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Energy after 1996 0.021 -.015 -.042 -.043 -.016
(0.016) (0.013) (0.022)￿ (0.022)￿ (0.022)
Rail&road after 1997 0.014 -.004 -.013 -.013 0.072
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015)￿￿￿
Post&telecom after 1998 0.037 -.012 -.004 -.005 -.024
(0.018)￿￿ (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024)
Number of observations 9623 9623 9623 9623 7191
R2 0.164 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.254
The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual transitions from ￿xed-term to open-ended
employment in a given year, and zero otherwise. The measures of competition are dummies for working in
a treated sector one year before the treatment actually takes place or later. That is, a dummy for working
in the energy sector in 1996 or after, a dummy for working in the rail&road sector in 1997 or after and,
a dummy for working in the post&telecom sector in 1998 or after. The coe¢ cients are marked with * if
the level of signi￿cance is between 5% and 10%, ** if the level of signi￿cance is between 1% and 5% and
*** if the level of signi￿cance is less than 1%. The basic regression includes controls on individual and
job characteristics (age, married, household head, dummies for region of residence, high-school graduate,
university graduate, number of coworkers, dummies for duration of the ￿xed-term contract in years and
quarter dummies). The second column adds to the basic regression dummies for year. The third column
includes, in addition to the variables in column 2, dummies for industry of employment. Column 4
displays the results when individuals are weighted according to the ratio between the number of workers
in their industry one year before the date of the interview and the number of workers in their industry at
the time of the interview. Finally, column 5 adds individual ￿xed-e⁄ects. The sample is drawn from the
Spanish Labor Force Survey and comprises men aged 16 to 64 with a ￿xed-term contract who have no
seasonal jobs over the period 1993 to 2003. The industries are energy, rail&road, post&telecom, airline
and retail. The airline and retail industries serve as controls. Errors are clustered by sector-year.
59Appendix A: The theoretical model
Solving the model
This section is devoted to show some intermediate derivations of the results of the
theoretical model developed in section 2.
Each ￿rm maximizes expected pro￿ts with respect to the proportion of open-ended
out of high productivity workers, ￿: The formula for the expected pro￿ts is:
E(￿) = E(￿1) + ￿E(￿2) =























where ￿ is implicitly included in the expressions for E(a2) and E(a2
2) which are:
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60Comparative statics
The comparative statics analysis assumes that the number of ￿rms is endogenous. In
order to know how the optimal proportion of open-ended over total high productivity

























where the ￿rst equality holds because of the chain rule of derivation and the second
holds because of the implicit function theorem and the fact that ￿ = 0 due to free entry.
Computing the relevant derivatives and substituting their value on the previous ex-
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(3)
This implies that an increase in competition through a decrease in product di⁄erenti-
ation would decrease the proportion of open-ended workers if and only if the expression
above is positive and the reverse is true.
The same reasoning as for the incidence of changes in product di⁄erentiation, d; applies
for the incidence of market size, m, on ￿. One ￿nds that the sign of the total derivative















This shows that an increase in competition through a rise in market size would reduce
the proportion of open-ended workers if and only if the above expression is negative and
the reverse is true. Note that when the expression above is positive expression (3) is
negative and vice versa.
Finally, the expression for the total change in the optimal proportion of open-ended
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(4)
This means that an increase in competition through a decrease in entry costs reduces
the proportion of open-ended contracts if and only if expression (4) is positive. When
this happens, an increase in competition always leads to a reduction in the proportion
of open-ended contracts if expression (3) is negative. On the contrary, an increase in
competition through a decrease in entry cost rises the proportion of open-ended contracts
if and only if expression (4) is negative. In this case, an increase in competition always
leads to a rise in the proportion of open-ended contracts.
62Appendix B: The instrumental variable estimation us-
ing the Spanish Labor Force Survey
Table B.1: List of industries included in the sample
Industries included in the instrumental variables speci￿cation
1 Food products and beveradges
2 Tobacco
3 Textile
4 Textile elaborated products and leather
5 Leather elaborated products and footwear
6 Wood except furniture
7 Pulp, paper and paper elaborated products
8 Printing and publishing
9 Coke, re￿ned petroleum products
10 Chemicals
11 Rubber and plastics products
12 Other non-metallic mineral products
13 Basic metals
14 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
15 Machinery and equipment
16 O¢ ce, accounting and computing machinery
17 Electrical machinery and apparatus
18 Radio, television and communication equipment
19 Medical, precision & optical instruments, watches and clocks
20 Motor vehicles
21 Other transport equipment
22 Furniture
23 Recycling
24 Electricity and gas
25 Water supply
This is the list of industries for which there is information on the price-cost margin and on the
Regulatory Impact so that they can be included in the instrumental variables estimation.
63Table B.2: Estimation by instrumental variables displaying con-
trols (Spanish Labor Force Survey)
basic year sector weighted
Dep var: Transition to open-ended (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 0.0006 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0002)￿￿￿ (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Married -.002 0.002 0.001 0.00009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Household head 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013
(0.004)￿￿￿ (0.004)￿￿￿ (0.005)￿￿￿ (0.005)￿￿￿
Spanish citizenship 0.024 0.035 0.036 0.033
(0.017) (0.016)￿￿ (0.016)￿￿ (0.017)￿￿
High-school graduate 0.017 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.004)￿￿￿ (0.003)￿￿￿ (0.004)￿￿￿ (0.004)￿￿￿
University graduate 0.038 0.024 0.023 0.023
(0.006)￿￿￿ (0.006)￿￿￿ (0.006)￿￿￿ (0.006)￿￿￿
Number of coworkers 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.00005)￿￿￿ (0.00004)￿￿ (0.00004)￿￿ (0.00004)￿￿
One year
￿xed-term contract duration 0.185 0.181 0.181 0.181
(0.007)￿￿￿ (0.007)￿￿￿ (0.007)￿￿￿ (0.007)￿￿￿
Two years
￿xed-term contract duration 0.039 0.028 0.028 0.029
(0.005)￿￿￿ (0.006)￿￿￿ (0.006)￿￿￿ (0.006)￿￿￿
Three years
￿xed-term contract duration 0.29 0.273 0.273 0.271
(0.016)￿￿￿ (0.016)￿￿￿ (0.016)￿￿￿ (0.016)￿￿￿
Wage di⁄erential 8.87e-08 1.86e-07 -3.85e-08 -1.14e-08
(1.50e-07) (1.10e-07)￿ (2.33e-07) (2.30e-07)
Number of observations 31737 31737 31737 31737
R2 0.132 0.144 0.144 0.144
The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual transitions from ￿xed-term to open-ended
employment within a sector in a given year, and zero otherwise. The measure of competition is the price-
cost margin multiplied by minus one. This is instrumented using the Regulatory Impact. The coe¢ cients
are marked with * if the level of signi￿cance is between 5% and 10%, ** if the level of signi￿cance is
between 1% and 5% and *** if the level of signi￿cance is less than 1%. The basic regression includes
controls on individual and job characteristics (age, married, household head, dummies for region of
residence, high-school graduate, university graduate, number of coworkers, dummies for duration of the
￿xed-term contract in years and quarter dummies). The second column adds year dummies to the basic
regression. The third column includes, in addition to the variables in column 2, dummies for industry
of employment. Finally, column 4 displays the results when individuals are weighted according to the
ratio between the number of workers in their industry one year before the date of the interview and the
number of workers in their industry at the time of the interview. The sample is drawn from the Spanish
64Labor Force Survey and includes men aged 16 to 64 with a ￿xed-term contract who have no seasonal jobs
over the period 1993 to 2003. The price-cost margin is obtained from the Industrial Enterprise Survey.
The Regulatory Impact is drawn from the OECD database. The industries included are listed in table
B.1. Errors are clustered by sector-year.
65Appendix C: The instrumental variable estimation us-
ing Business Strategies Survey
Table C.1: List of industries included in the sample
Industries included in the instrumental variables speci￿cation
1 Meat products
2 Food products and tobacco
3 Beveradges
4 Textile and textile elaborated products
5 Leather, leather elaborated products and footwear
6 Wood except furniture
7 Pulp, paper and paper elaborated products
8 Printing and publishing
9 Chemicals
10 Rubber and plastics products
11 Other non-metallic mineral products
12 Basic metals
13 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
14 Machinery and equipment
15 O¢ ce, accounting and computing machinery
16 Electrical machinery and apparatus
17 Motor vehicles
18 Other transport equipment
19 Furniture
This is the list of industries for which there is information in the Business Strategies Survey.
66Table C.2: Estimation by instrumental variables displaying con-
trols (Business Strategies Survey)
basic year sector weights ￿rm fe
Dep var: Proportion of open-ended (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of workers 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 0.00002 -.00002
(2.99e-06)￿￿￿ (2.94e-06)￿￿￿ (2.81e-06)￿￿￿ (2.93e-06)￿￿￿ (8.99e-06)￿
Percentage of university grads 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 -.001
(0.0005)￿￿￿ (0.0005)￿￿￿ (0.0005)￿￿￿ (0.0005)￿￿￿ (0.0005)￿￿
Percentage of high school grads 0.001 0.001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0002
(0.0002)￿￿￿ (0.0002)￿￿￿ (0.0002)￿￿￿ (0.0002)￿￿ (0.0003)
Percentage of part-time workers 0.0005 0.0005 0.0007 0.0006 0.003
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)￿ (0.0004)￿ (0.0005)￿￿￿
Blue over white collar workers 0.001 0.001 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007
(0.0002)￿￿￿ (0.0002)￿￿￿ (0.0003)￿￿ (0.0003)￿￿ (0.0006)
Wages over production 0.031 0.039 0.021 0.021 0.037
(0.016)￿ (0.015)￿￿￿ (0.014) (0.014) (0.01)￿￿￿
Training expenditures per worker 0.00005 0.00002 8.80e-06 9.43e-06 -.00004
(1.00e-05)￿￿￿ (1.00e-05) (1.00e-05) (1.00e-05) (1.00e-05)￿￿￿
Worker compensations over production 0.552 0.588 0.549 0.55 0.118
(0.039)￿￿￿ (0.04)￿￿￿ (0.039)￿￿￿ (0.038)￿￿￿ (0.033)￿￿￿
Merged ￿rm 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.022 0.002
(0.01)￿￿ (0.01)￿￿ (0.01)￿￿ (0.01)￿￿ (0.008)
Split ￿rm 0.059 0.064 0.062 0.052 0.018
(0.013)￿￿￿ (0.014)￿￿￿ (0.013)￿￿￿ (0.015)￿￿￿ (0.01)￿
R&D over production 0.115 0.174 0.065 0.101 -.101
(0.07)￿ (0.066)￿￿￿ (0.063) (0.067) (0.078)
Public capital over total capital 0.0007 0.0008 0.001 0.0009 0.0007
(0.00009)￿￿￿ (0.0001)￿￿￿ (0.0001)￿￿￿ (0.0001)￿￿￿ (0.0002)￿￿￿
The dependent variable is equal to proportion of open-ended over total contracted workers. The
measure of competition is average price-cost margin in the industry multiplied by minus one. This is
instrumented using the Regulatory Impact. The coe¢ cients are marked with * if the level of signi￿cance
is between 5% and 10%, ** if the level of signi￿cance is between 1% and 5% and *** if the level of signi￿-
cance is less than 1%. The basic regression includes controls on workers and ￿rm characteristics (number
of workers, percentage of engineers and college graduates -separating long and short degrees-, percent-
age of workers with intermediate education, percentage of part-time permanent workers, ratio of blue
over white collar workers, wages over production, workers training expenditures over production, worker
compensations over production, merged ￿rm, split ￿rm, individual entrepreneur, R&D over production
and percentage of public capital). The second column adds year dummies to the basic regression. The
third column includes, in addition to the variables in column 2, dummies for industry of employment.
Column 4 displays the results when ￿rms are weighted according to the ratio between the number of
workers in their industry one year before the date of the interview and the number of workers in their
industry at the time of the interview. Finally, column 5 is estimated using ￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ects. The sample
is drawn from the Business Strategies Survey and includes ￿rms whose level of diversi￿cation does not
exceed one industry as de￿ned by the 2-digit classi￿cation over the period 1992 to 2006. The industries
included are listed in table C.1. The price-cost margin is obtained from the Business Strategies Survey.
The Regulatory Impact is drawn from the OECD database. Errors are clustered by sector-year. The
F statistic of the excluded instrument in the ￿rst stage corresponding to the last column estimation is
24.05. This ￿gure is clearly over the critical value provided by Stock and Yogo (2005) which indicates
that the instrument is not weak.
67Appendix D: Additional speci￿cations
Table D.1: Business Strategies Survey results measuring compe-
tition with the Concentration Index
Estimation by ordinary least squares
basic year sector weights ￿rm fe
Dep var: Proportion of permanent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
- Concentration ratio -.098 -.113 -.018 -.012 0.002
(0.03)￿￿￿ (0.029)￿￿￿ (0.03) (0.03) (0.027)
Number of observations 17705 17705 17705 17705 17705
Estimation by instrumental variables
basic year sector weights ￿rm fe
Dep var: Proportion of permanent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
- Concentration ratio 0.137 -.476 -1.733 -2.520 -.761
(0.153) (0.222)￿￿ (0.978)￿ (2.078) (0.458)￿
Number of observations 17705 17705 17705 17705 17417
The dependent variable is the proportion of open-ended over total contracted workers. The measure
of competition is the average concentration ratio in the industry multiplied by minus one. This is
instrumented using the Regulatory Impact. The coe¢ cients are marked with * if the level of signi￿cance
is between 5% and 10%, ** if the level of signi￿cance is between 1% and 5% and *** if the level of
signi￿cance is less than 1%. The basic regression includes controls on workers and ￿rm characteristics
(number of workers, percentage of engineers and college graduates -separating long and short degrees-,
percentage of workers with intermediate education, percentage of part-time permanent workers, ratio of
blue over white collar workers, wages over production, workers training expenditures over production,
worker compensations over production, a dummy for merged ￿rm, an indicator for split ￿rm, a binary
variable for individual entrepreneur, R&D over production and percentage of public capital) The second
column adds year dummies to the basic regression. The third column includes, in addition to the variables
in column 2, dummies for industry of employment. Column 4 displays the results when ￿rms are weighted
according to the ratio between the number of workers in their industry one year before the date of the
interview and the number of workers in their industry at the time of the interview. Finally, column 5 is
estimated using ￿rm ￿xed-e⁄ects. The sample is drawn from the Business Strategies Survey and includes
￿rms whose level of diversi￿cation does not exceed one industry as de￿ned by the 2-digit classi￿cation
over the period 1992 to 2006. The industries included are listed in table C.1. The concentration ratio is
obtained from the Business Strategies Survey. The Regulatory Impact is drawn from the OECD database.
Errors are clustered by sector-year. The F test of the excluded instrument in the ￿rst stage corresponding
to the last column estimation is 20.87. This ￿gure is clearly over the critical value provided by Stock and
Yogo (2005) which indicates that the instrument is not weak.
68Table D.2: Estimation by instrumental variables including switch-
ers and assigning workers to the initial industry (Labor Force
Survey)
basic switchers interaction
Dep var: Transition to open-ended (1) (2) (3)




- Price-cost margin by Switcher -.064
(0.163)
Number of observations 34000 34000 34000
R2 0.137 0.138 0.138
The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual transitions from a ￿xed-term to open-ended
employment within a sector in a given year, and zero otherwise. The measure of competition is the
price-cost margin multiplied by minus one. The coe¢ cients are marked with * if the level of signi￿cance
is between 5% and 10%, ** if the level of signi￿cance is between 1% and 5% and *** if the level of
signi￿cance is less than 1%. The basic regression includes controls on individual and job characteristics
(age, married, household head, dummies for region of residence, high-school graduate, university graduate,
number of coworkers, dummies for duration of the ￿xed-term contract in years and quarter dummies),
year and industry of employment dummies, as well as individual ￿xed-e⁄ects. The second column adds a
indicator for switcher. The third column includes, in addition to the variables in column 2, an interaction
of the measure of competition and an indicator for switcher. In all speci￿cations, individuals are weighted
according to the ratio between the number of workers in their industry one year before the date of the
interview and the number of workers in their industry at the time of the interview. The sample is drawn
from the Spanish Labor Force Survey and includes men aged 16 to 64 with a ￿xed-term contract who
have no seasonal jobs over the period 1993 to 2003. The industries included are listed in table B.1. The
price-cost margin is obtained from the Industrial Enterprise Survey. Errors are clustered by sector-year.
69Table D.3: Quasi-experiment accounting for treatment intensity
(Labor Force Survey)
basic year sector weighted panel
Transition to open-ended (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Barriers reduction 0.03 -.021 -.036 -.036 -.120
(0.013)￿￿ (0.013) (0.013)￿￿￿ (0.013)￿￿￿ (0.037)￿￿￿
Number of observations 9667 9667 9667 9667 7235
R2 0.162 0.167 0.168 0.168 0.252
The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual transitions from ￿xed-term to open-ended
employment within a sector in a given year, and zero otherwise. The measure of competition the inter-
action of a dummy for working in a treated sector in the post-treatment period with the proportion of
removed legal barriers to entry in each sector according to the OECD. The coe¢ cients are marked with *
if the level of signi￿cance is between 5% and 10%, ** if the level of signi￿cance is between 1% and 5% and
*** if the level of signi￿cance is less than 1%. The basic regression includes controls on individual and
job characteristics (age, married, household head, dummies for region of residence, high-school graduate,
university graduate, number of coworkers, dummies for duration of the ￿xed-term contract in years and
quarter dummies). The second column adds year dummies to the basic regression. The third column
includes, in addition to the variables in column 2, dummies for industry of employment. Column 4 dis-
plays the results when individuals are weighted according to the ratio between the number of workers in
their industry one year before the date of the interview and the number of workers in their industry at
the time of the interview. Finally, column 5 adds individual ￿xed-e⁄ects. The sample is drawn from the
Spanish Labor Force Survey and comprises men aged 16 to 64 with a ￿xed-term contract who have no
seasonal jobs over the period 1993 to 2003. The industries included are energy, rail&road, post&telecom,
airline and retail. The airline and retail industries serve as controls. Errors are clustered by sector-year.
70Table D.4: Estimation by instrumental variables and quasi-experiment
with two dimensional cluster (Labor Force Survey)
Estimation by instrumental variables
basic year sector weighted
Dep var: Transition to open-ended (1) (2) (3) (4)
- Price-cost margin 0.658 0.093 -.802 -.771
(0.169)￿￿￿ (0.056)￿ (0.277)￿￿￿ (0.327)￿￿
Number of observations 31043 31043 31043 31043
R2 0.135 0.148 0.148 0.148
Quasi-experiment
basic year sector weighted ind fe
Dep var: Transition to open-ended (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Energy after 1997 0.02 -.026 -.046 -.050 -.197
(0.015) (0.009)￿￿￿ (0.019)￿￿ (0.025)￿￿ (0.029)￿￿￿
Rail&road after 1998 0.015 -.010 -.022 -.021 -.040
(0.012) (0.01) (0.009)￿￿ (0.008)￿￿ (0.007)￿￿￿
Post&telecom after 1999 0.032 -.026 -.021 -.025 -.127
(0.019)￿ (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.067)￿
Number of observations 9623 9623 9623 9623 7191
R2 0.163 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.255
The dependent variable is equal to one if the individual transitions from ￿xed-term to open-ended
employment within a sector in a given year, and zero otherwise. In the ￿rst panel, the measure of
competition is the price-cost margin multiplied by minus one. This is instrumented using the Regulatory
Impact. In the second panel, the measures of competition are a dummy for working in the energy sector
in 1997 or after, a dummy for working in the rail&road sector in 1998 or after, and a dummy for working
in the post&telecom sector in 1999 or after. The coe¢ cients are marked with * if the level of signi￿cance
is between 5% and 10%, ** if the level of signi￿cance is between 1% and 5% and *** if the level of
signi￿cance is less than 1%. The basic regression includes controls on individual and job characteristics
(age, married, household head, dummies for region of residence, high-school graduate, university graduate,
number of coworkers, dummies for duration of the ￿xed-term contract in years and quarter dummies).
The second column adds year dummies to the basic regression. The third column includes, in addition
to the variables in column 2, dummies for industry of employment. Column 4 displays the results when
individuals are weighted according to the ratio between the number of workers in their industry one year
before the date of the interview and the number of workers in their industry at the time of the interview.
Finally, column 5 in the second panel adds individual ￿xed e⁄ects. The sample is drawn from the Spanish
Labor Force Survey and includes men aged 16 to 64 with a ￿xed-term contract who have no seasonal jobs
over the period 1993 to 2003. The price-cost margin is obtained from the Industrial Enterprise Survey.
The Regulatory Impact is drawn from the OECD database. The industries included in the estimation
71by instrumental variables are listed in table B.1. The industries in the quasi-experiment are energy,
rail&road, post&telecom, airline and retail. The airline and retail industries serve as controls. Errors are
clustered in the sector-year and individual dimensions. The F statistic of the excluded instrument in the
￿rst stage corresponding to the last column of the IV estimation is 24.05. This ￿gure is clearly over the
critical value provided by Stock and Yogo (2005) which indicates that the instrument is not weak.
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